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“ANYTHING AND EVERYTHING”:
THE PROBLEMATIC LIFE
OF CONVIVENCIA
Abigail Hartman
In early 2015, poet and novelist Steven Nightingale pub-
lished his first piece of nonfiction.  Granada: A Pomegranate 
in the Hand of God is in some ways the author’s love-letter to 
the city in southern Spain, an expression of appreciation for the 
rich culture and complex past of a place that “has had an 
uncanny influence in the history of Europe and the world.  It is 
a hive of stories, of sweetness, and of secrets.  We might call it 
a pomegranate in the hand of God.”1 The pomegranate stands 
in the book as a symbol of the multicultural, multireligious 
society of al-Andalus—a society which, in its peaceful heyday 
when “the three principal religious communities of the Mediter-
ranean settled down to live together,” produced a wealth of 
literature, architecture, and art.2
Nightingale’s goal is to bring these achievements to light, 
a pursuit he likens to “the excavation of buried treasure” that 
over the years has been “lost under layers of confusion, 
ideology, propaganda, ignorance, religious animosity, indiffer-
ence, and hot debate.”3  Expressing frustration with academics 
who would complicate, minimize, or even dismiss this cultural 
1 Steven Nightingale, Granada: A Pomegranate in the Hand of 
God (Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint Press, 2015), 8.
2 Ibid., 120-121.
3 Ibid., 198.
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zenith,4 and desiring “to let the work of the period speak for 
itself,”5 he embarks on an experiential, sensual exploration of 
al-Andalus’ artistic triumphs: its enduring Islamic architecture; 
the musical tradition of flamenco; the poetry and philosophy of 
such men as Samuel ibn Neghrela, a Jew who served as a 
general and vizier under Muslim rule, and Ramon Llull, a 
Franciscan who also translated Muslim writings and studied 
Jewish mysticism.  All of these wonders, he argues, were made 
possible only by the pluralism of Spain’s medieval days, by the 
coexistence, known as convivencia, of Christianity, Judaism, 
and Islam.  Though not himself a historian, his perspective on 
the convivencia is worth quoting at length, as it embodies one 
extreme in the debate that has been ongoing since the term was 
introduced to historiography in the mid-20th century:
The convivencia was a dangerous experiment.  It pro-
ceeded by fits and starts, setbacks and abominations, 
strange alliances, unexpected advances, and practical 
ingenuities.  Its achievements, only recently come into
focus, were without precedent in Europe.  It is a school-
room where we might learn, we who even now are fail-
ing disastrously to live together at a time with much 
more dangerous weapons and billions of lives at stake.  
And we might start by learning from its fate, when in 
the fifteenth century al-Andalus, with all its accumulat-
ed knowledge and accomplishments, met King Ferdi-
nand and Queen Isabel.  The two monarchs brought to 
the Iberian peninsula a will to power, a formidable       
union, a sense of messianic duty, and, in 1480, their own 
4 Such dismissal, he implies, can only be explained as the result 
of sheer bigotry and unwillingness to accept the influence of non-
Christian cultures in the making of Spain; see ibid., 246.
5 Ibid., 129.
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specially designed government agency: the Holy Inqui-
sition.6
Indeed, Nightingale’s take on medieval Spain represents 
everything that inspires Maya Soifer in her 2009 article 
“Beyond Convivencia” to reject the word altogether.  In her 
view convivencia is “loaded with a cacophony of problematic 
associations,”7 including a portrait of medieval Spain as a 
uniquely harmonious society in contrast with a backwards, 
intolerant Europe.  Indeed, she believes the term has been so 
debated and manipulated over time that it can only have 
associations, not substance: “Convivencia can be anything and 
everything,” and, at the same time, nothing.  “Why use a term 
weighted down by ideological contentiousness and corrupted 
by generalizations and unprovable assumptions?” she asks 
rhetorically.8
Soifer’s article is part of a recent historiographical back-
lash against the term first coined, or at least popularized, by 
Américo Castro in 1948.9 Convivencia itself appears at first 
6 Ibid., 188.  In an endnote Nightingale admits the contentious-
ness of the term and the continuing debate over how exactly this 
“living together” worked in daily practice, but adds that “for this 
writer, these debates are a tiresome and troublesome waste of life, 
a kind of conceptual tar pit” (p. 354, n. 188).  The really interest-
ing question, in his mind, is what was achieved artistically in the
period.  Presumably, then, he would also have little or no interest 
in a historiographical paper like this.
7 Maya Soifer, “Beyond Convivencia: Critical Reflections on 
the Historiography of Interfaith Relations in Christian Spain,”
Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies 1, no. 1 (2009): 31.
8 Ibid., 21.
9 Castro is generally seen as the father of convivencia; Alex 
Novikoff, however, observes that Castro borrowed the term from 
the philologist Ramón Menéndez Pidal.  See Alex Novikoff, 
“Between Tolerance and Intolerance in Medieval Spain: An 
Historiographic Enigma,” Medieval Encounters 11, no. 1 (2005): 
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glance a deceptively simple word, translating roughly to “living 
together” and referring to the period of Spanish history—from 
the Muslim invasion of 711 to the expulsion of the Jews and 
Muslims in 1492—when those who professed Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam inhabited the Iberian Peninsula.  That 
simplicity, however, belies the complexity of the issue, and 
historians since Castro have used convivencia in a variety of 
ways to describe what that “living together” looked like and 
what its impact has been on Spanish identity.  Castro envi-
sioned the term as (in Soifer’s words) “an idealist construct that 
aspired to describe the mental processes taking place in the 
collective consciousness of the three cultures.”10 Subsequent 
historians, such as Thomas F. Glick, have reformulated it as a 
social construct, a means of describing the grand structure and 
evolutionary process of cultural change; others, like David 
Nirenberg, have applied it at the level of microhistory in an 
effort to explain the dynamics of interfaith relations “on the 
ground.” Still others, in the vein of Steven Nightingale, employ 
it as a concise descriptor of a near-utopian society that the 
modern world has been struggling ever since to regain.  Indeed, 
the very flexibility and “limitless susceptibility to manipulation
and reinvention” that Soifer decries11 has contributed in large 
measure to the enduring appeal of the term; for it captures, 
without actually describing or explaining, the intriguing 
realities of cultural contact in medieval Spain.
This period of history has gripped non-Spanish imagina-
tions at least since Washington Irving published his Tales of the 
Alhambra in 1832, but interest was revived for Hispanists 
during the unsettling era of Francisco Franco’s regime.  The 
20th century saw in Spain a nationalist crisis, as scholars 
attempted to reconcile the glories of a past empire with “the 
‘enigma’ of modern Spain . . . hopelessly out of step with,” and 
18 and 20 for a discussion of Pidal’s contributions to Spanish 
historiography and Castro’s revisionist response.
10 Soifer, “Beyond Convivencia,” 20.
11 Ibid., 21.
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demonized by, “the rest of Europe.”12 Spain labored not only 
under the weight of current political and economic troubles, but 
also under the “Black Legend” of inquisition and genocide that 
had dogged her since the 17th century—and which Nightingale 
has perhaps unwittingly restated.  Perceived by Europe as 
backwards, persecutory, fanatic, Spain herself did not seem to 
know what to do with her history and current identity.
This deep anxiety and pessimism, mingled with a contra-
dictory sense of nationalist pride, underlies the works of 
Américo Castro.  His España en su historia: cristianos, moros, 
y judios, published in 1948, while Castro was in exile in the 
United States, was written as a corrective to popular views of 
Spanish history. It was not meant, however, merely as an effort 
to regain historical truths for their own sake, but as a wake-up 
call to the nation of Spain.  “The greatest service that historiog-
raphy can offer in these times, replete with threatening omens, 
is to nail down the reasons for our deficiencies, to comprehend 
how it is that as a people we were so grandiose in our past 
undertakings and are so uneasy, troubled, and failure-prone 
today.”13 This required an understanding of “how the inner 
habits of Spanish life have been formed”14—a goal Castro 
insists cannot be achieved using the “economicomaterialistic 
reasoning” of the then-popular Annales school of historians.15
12 Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Convivencia in Medieval Spain: A 
Brief History of an Idea,” Religion Compass 3, no. 1 (2009): 73.
13 Américo Castro, “The Millennium Between ‘España’ and 
‘Español,’” in An Idea of History: Selected Essays of Americo 
Castro,” trans. and ed. Stephen Gilman and Edmund L. King 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 216.
14 Américo Castro, “The Spanish People,” in An Idea of Histo-
ry: Selected Essays of Americo Castro,” trans. and ed. Stephen 
Gilman and Edmund L. King (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1977), 190.
15 Américo Castro, The Spaniards: An Introduction to Their 
History, trans. Edmund L. King and Selma Margaretten (Universi-
ty of California Press, 1971), 3.  Castro finds nothing good to say 
Furman Humanities Review
6
Questions of economics and demographics fail to reach the 
heart of the issue, which for Castro is the forging of a collective 
identity; what is important in his history are thus not “numerical 
figures” but “acts of human will and volition,” not structures 
and environmental influences but the ways in which people 
conceived of themselves and then articulated those concep-
tions.16
Since “language makes history comprehensible” and is “a
way of expressing and interpreting life,” Castro turns to his 
own area of expertise, philology, to elucidate this question of 
identity-formation.17 Himself a literary critic (with an especial 
focus on Cervantes), he focuses on works “expressive of 
collective life”18—classics such as the Poem of the Cid, whose 
structures and vocabularies reveal much about the social milieu 
in which they were written.  What they revealed to Castro was 
the absurdity of the traditional view held by Hispanists, who 
believed in an innate, eternal “Spanishness” running through all 
of Iberian history and who conflated modern Spanish identity 
with that of the peninsula’s oldest inhabitants.19 In Castro’s 
of the Annales, whom he sees as materialistic and dangerously 
dismissive of the human side of life.  He is especially critical of 
Fernand Braudel, whose The Mediterranean “confers the function 
of actors in human history on natural elements and population 
statistics” (7).  Castro is vitally concerned with recovering the 
status of human agency in history, although he admits acerbically 
that he “sounds anachronistic and reactionary today” (6).
16 Ibid., 10.
17 Ibid., 14.
18 Ibid., 89.
19 “The Spaniard,” Castro observes sarcastically, “considers 
himself virtually an emanation from the soil of the Iberian 
Peninsula, or at least a being as ancient as the prehistoric Peninsu-
lar cave dwellers. . . . Thus the Spanishness of the prehistoric 
inhabitants in the mountainous regions of the Province of Santan-
der continues uninterrupted in the people who make cheese in the 
grottos of Cabrales”; ibid., 20.  
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view this myth is debunked through even a cursory study of the 
word “españa” itself, which was not adopted by the inhabitants 
of what we now call Spain until the late-13th century; prior to 
this, there was no unified Spanish identity, only local affilia-
tions and the common bond of being Christian.20 To apply the 
term “Spaniard” prior to the Muslim invasion of 711 was to 
him a painful anachronism, for that identity was produced only 
by the convivencia, the long period of “living together”
following the arrival of the Moors.21 “The Spanish people came 
into being,” Castro insists, “in a process starting in the eighth 
century and continuing through the Muslim invasion, as a 
conglomeration of three castes of believers—Christians, Moors, 
and Jews.”22
This convivencia, as Castro saw it, was not a utopia but a 
tolerance brought about by circumstances: in the long process 
of Reconquista, the Catholic states of Spain were required to 
keep themselves in constant readiness for war either with each 
other or with the Muslims, and thus had no time for scholarly 
achievements.  It was necessary, then, for rulers like Alfonso 
VI of Leon and Castile (1040-1109) and Alfonso X of Castile 
(1221-1284) to adopt what Castro considers the uniquely 
Islamic practice of religious toleration, enabling them to take 
advantage of the intellectual and administrative skills provided 
by non-Christian subjects.23 This tolerance, however, was the 
20 Américo Castro, “The Millennium Between ‘España’ and 
‘Español,’” 206.
21 Castro, “The Spanish People,” 191.
22 Ibid., 188.
23 Of the cultural efflorescence during the reign of Alfonso X 
“The Learned,” for example, Castro writes, “Arabic sciences and 
technical knowledge were imported by the Castilian Christian 
because of their practical and artistic efficacy. . . .  The Jew served 
as an intermediary between the Moor and the Christian in many 
ways, and through him the Castilian of the dominant caste was 
able to become master of his lands, conqueror of the Moor, and 
Furman Humanities Review
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result of necessity.  Once the “Hispano-Christian” grew in 
power and no longer required the cooperation of the other two 
“castes,” his obsession with religious purity and his will to 
dominate drove him to expel them from the peninsula.24  From
this act Castro traced the story of Spain’s artistic and intellectu-
al decline, perpetuated by historians who ignored the Jewish 
and Muslim influence upon Spanish identity and continued to 
cultivate the myth of the “eternal Spaniard.”
One such historian, from Castro’s perspective, was 
Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, who wrote his 1956 España: un 
enigma histórico in response to Castro’s thesis.  He did not 
deny, of course, that Muslims and Jews had lived alongside 
Christians in medieval Spain; what he did reject was the idea 
that non-Christian cultures had had a formative role in the 
creation of Spanish identity.  In his view, there was a funda-
mental Spanish identity that could not be essentially altered
by contact with other cultures; and this identity could be seen, 
not in the supposed tolerance of convivencia, but in the “pas-
sion . . . for divine war” that moved the common people to acts 
of violence against Jews and Muslims.25 Convivencia was a 
state of existence imposed upon society by the elite, but it was 
fundamentally at odds with the eternal Spanish character that 
valued religious unity above all.26
If Sánchez-Albornoz’s critique of convivencia has ulti-
mately endured, Castro nevertheless got the better of the debate 
in the short term.  His position was more or less recapitulated in 
eventually executor of the Hispano-Hebrew prophecies of imperial 
dominion of the world.” Castro, The Spaniards, 539.
24 Castro, “The Spanish People,” 197.
25 Novikoff, “Between Tolerance and Intolerance,” 23.  
Sánchez-Albornoz’s work, unlike Castro’s, has not been well 
translated into English (a fact which itself speaks volumes 
regarding the outcome of the debate); comments on his España in 
the present essay must therefore draw upon other historiographical 
articles, such as Novikoff’s.
26 Ibid., 23.
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1985 by J. N. Hillgarth, whose “Spanish Historiography and 
Iberian Reality” investigates the “power of certain myths” in 
Hispanist literature.27 One such myth sprang from the pen of 
Isidore of Seville, who envisioned the Goths as the people 
chosen by God to rule over Spain, and this myth has continued 
in various manifestations throughout Spanish history.  Hillgarth 
believed that the Isidorian myth powerfully motivated Ferdi-
nand and Isabella’s efforts to unite the peninsula under their 
own Catholic banner when it was revived in the 15th century,28
and he saw it breathing still in the 20th-century writings of 
“eternal Spain” historians like Sánchez-Albornoz.  Américo 
Castro, too, was “inspired by a myth,” one that “can be summed 
up in the word he often uses, convivencia.”29 Yet Hillgarth 
found Castro’s myth more fruitful, less untrue, than that of 
Sánchez-Albornoz.  For “despite many outbreaks of intolerance 
. . . Christians, Jews, and Muslims did coexist for centuries in 
Spain—unlike the rest of Western Europe,”30 and in the late 
15th century Spain, “which had rested on the support of three 
religions, was thrown out of balance by the removal or denial of 
two of the three.”31 Convivencia thus remained to Hillgarth 
what it was to Castro: an idealist concept, a “myth” or construct 
of a people’s identity, important in its oppositional nature to the 
myth of an eternal Spain.
By the time Hillgarth wrote, however, historians were al-
ready “engaged in correcting Castro’s mistakes”32 and, in the 
27 J. N. Hillgarth, “Spanish Historiography and Iberian Reali-
ty,” History and Theory 24, no. 1 (1985): 23.
28 Ibid., 29.
29 Ibid., 33.
30 Ibid., 34.
31 Ibid., 32.
32 Ibid., 33.  Hillgarth, while obviously favoring Castro, never-
theless admits here that Castro “sometimes forced [the conse-
quences of cultural contact] further than the evidence allowed.”
Thus, Hillgarth seems to have generally approved of the corrective 
work of colleagues like Glick—although he takes issue with what 
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process, substantially reinterpreting convivencia.  The most 
influential scholar in this pursuit was Thomas F. Glick, whose 
1969 article “Acculturation as an Explanatory Concept in 
Spanish History” (with anthropologist Oriol Pi-Sunyer) and 
1979 monograph Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early 
Middle Ages introduced a sociological perspective to the study 
of the convivencia.  Alex Novikoff aptly sums up Glick’s 
perspective as “‘post-Castro and post-Sánchez-Albornoz,’ that 
is, steering clear of the quest for national origins.”33  Indeed, in 
the last half of the 20th century, the fascination with such quests 
was becoming less popular as the very definition of a “nation”
was heavily revised.  Whereas Castro could speak of a “pro-
gressive formation of the [Spanish] WE,” traceable “in docu-
ments, oral literature, or works of art as it attains its collective 
plenitude,”34 by the 1970s-80s theorists were dismissing such 
philological foundations of nationalism out of hand: “Nations 
as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent 
though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth,” Ernest 
Gellner stated definitively in 1983.  “What do exist are cultures, 
often subtly grouped, shading into each other, overlapping, 
intertwined.”35 Similarly, Glick expressed disappointment with 
both Castro and Sánchez-Albornoz for fixating on “the issue of 
modal personality.”36 Proclaiming the debate officially over—
since “however one may approach it, the central phenomenon 
of medieval Spain . . . is the meeting and bilateral adjustment of 
he sees as Glick’s heavy-handed critique of convivencia (see ibid., 
34).  
33 Novikoff, “Between Tolerance and Intolerance,” 30.
34 Américo Castro, “The Historical ‘WE,’” in An Idea of Histo-
ry: Selected Essays of Americo Castro,” trans. and ed. Stephen 
Gilman and Edmund L. King (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1977), 320.
35 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1983), 48-49.
36 Thomas F. Glick, Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early 
Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 10.
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two distinct cultures, Christian and Muslim”37—Glick encour-
aged his compatriots to step outside its constraints.  Conviven-
cia, he and Pi-Sunyer argued in 1969, was a (necessary) 
statement of the obvious; what it had not yet been able to 
achieve was the “delineation of a structure” of social change.  
If such an overarching model was to be developed, “then the 
mechanisms and conditions of cultural diffusion must be 
described systematically and classified” by sociological 
historians.38
Glick and Pi-Sunyer’s article was primarily theoretical, but 
Glick followed his own recommendation in his 1979 mono-
graph Islamic and Christian Spain, adopting a comparative 
approach in an attempt to explain, on the macro level, the 
processes by which Christian and the Islamic societies shaped 
one another in the period of convivencia.  Glick’s book reveals 
little interest in the effects of “living together” on the con-
sciousness of the modern Spaniard: Glick sees this as a narrow, 
idealist way of understanding convivencia, one which failed to 
grapple with the effect of historical variables like “power, 
wealth, numbers, or technology” on cultural contact and 
adaptation.39 Instead, the work examines Christian and Muslim 
societies as two “blocs” with “different cultures . . . [and]
different socio-economic systems” that gave them their 
distinctive structures.  Implicit in this understanding of Spanish 
history is an ironic reversal of Castro’s self-professed “human-
ism”: where Castro finds the core of society in its literature and 
art, Glick finds it in the society’s economic structure—whether 
“urban-artisanal,” as he characterizes the Islamic society, or 
“static-agrarian,” as he terms the Christian.40
37 Thomas F. Glick and Oriol Pi-Sunyer, “Acculturation as an 
Explanatory Concept in Spanish History,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 11, no. 2 (1969): 138.
38 Ibid., 147. 
39 Glick, Islamic and Christian Spain, 296.
40 Ibid., 6.  Castro would presumably have had the same nega-
tive assessment of Glick as he had of Braudel (cf. Castro, The 
Furman Humanities Review
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Unburdened by the weight of nationalist polemic, and ap-
parently unconcerned with what medieval art reveals about 
constructions of identity, Glick approaches Iberian history with 
precisely the goal he and Pi-Sunyer outlined in 1969: delineat-
ing a structure of social evolution, a model that could be 
applied beyond the spatial and temporal borders of medieval 
Spain.41 Beginning the work with a section on “Society and 
Economy,” which forms the bulk of the book and includes 
discussions of Mediterranean trade networks, ecology, agricul-
ture, settlement patterns, kinship structures, and feudalism, he 
moves on to a meticulously divided assessment of cultural 
diffusion: of technology, of science, of language.  Interestingly, 
however, and despite the increased accessibility of local 
archives following the collapse of the Franco regime,42 Glick’s 
work is less an original examination of primary sources than it 
is a tremendous effort at synthesizing the many focused articles 
and sweeping histories already available.  He marries topical 
studies on (to choose a few examples at random) watermills, 
mutton-eating, and the cultivation of cereals with broader, more 
theoretical works, including Marc Bloch’s Feudal Society,
Maurice Lombard and Harold Livermore’s structuralist 
histories of Spain, and, yes, Fernand Braudel’s The Mediterra-
nean.  Castro may have eschewed such a materialistic focus; 
but in Glick’s view, as he argued in his 1969 article, only 
through this “total history” approach “will the true structure of 
Spanish history”—and the true dynamics of convivencia—”be 
discernible in full relief.”43
Spaniards, 6); perhaps fortunately for Glick, however, Castro died 
in 1972, seven years before the publication of Islamic and 
Christian Spain, and thus did not have the opportunity of review-
ing it.
41 Glick and Pi-Sunyer, “Acculturation as an Explanatory Con-
cept,” 138.
42 Novikoff, “Between Tolerance and Intolerance,” 28.
43 Glick and Pi-Sunyer, “Acculturation as an Explanatory Con-
cept,” 154.
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Glick himself was critical of Castro’s term, seeing it as a 
“catch-all mechanism used to explain all phenomena of cultural 
change contingent upon the contact of cultures, an inclusivity 
which obscures what are in reality a number of different 
mechanisms”44; for his own purposes he preferred to use the 
term “acculturation,” which, while also a catch-all mechanism, 
implies a range of contact-dynamics and has no inherent link to 
medieval Spain as a unique phenomenon.45 Given his ambiva-
lence, it is perhaps ironic that his revivification of convivencia 
should have had such profound influence on historiography.  
From the 1960s to the 1990s in particular, social historians such 
as Robert I. Burns and John Boswell applied his acculturative 
model to the burgeoning field of “Mudéjar studies,” which 
examined the structure and evolution of Muslim societies under 
Catholic rule.46
His substantial contributions to future bibliographies attest 
to Burns’ particular influence in this field.  Like Glick, his work 
44 Glick, Islamic and Christian Spain, 281.  However, he seems 
to have warmed to the term or at least come to accept it by 1992, 
writing, “Convivencia survives.  What we add to it is the admis-
sion that cultural interaction inevitably reflects a concrete and very 
complex social dynamic.  What we retain of it is the understanding 
that acculturation implies a process of internalization of the ‘other’ 
that is the mechanism by which we make foreign cultural traits our 
own.” Thomas F. Glick, “Convivencia: An Introductory Note,” in 
Convivencia: Jews, Muslims, and Christians in Medieval Spain,
ed. Vivian B. Mann, Thomas F. Glick, and Jerrilynn D. Dodds 
(New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1992), 7.
45 Glick and Pi-Sunyer, “Acculturation as an Explanatory Con-
cept,” 138.
46 The term Mudéjar (roughly, “those who stayed”) began to be 
used by scholars around the turn of the 20th century to refer to 
those Muslims who remained in Iberia after the Reconquest but 
who did not convert to Christianity.  Morisco, by contrast, refers to 
Muslims who converted to Christianity following Ferdinand and 
Isabella’s 1492 ultimatum: convert or leave.
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on the late-13th-century crusader society of Valencia was the 
product of his interest in “structural ethnology” (he held a 
doctorate in anthropology as well as in medieval history47), but 
it also owed much to the Frontier Thesis that had been put 
forward by Frederick Jackson Turner in his 1893 essay “The 
Significance of the Frontier in American History.” Much like 
Castro’s articulation of convivencia itself, Turner’s central 
argument—that American exceptionalism was the product of 
“the existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, 
and the advance of American settlement westward”48—was 
largely rejected by subsequent historians even while they 
“salvaged elements from the Thesis, rearranged in novel 
forms.”49 One of these new forms was the concept of the 
frontier not as unique to North America, but in fact ubiquitous 
in Western history: in 1958, for instance, Archibald R. Lewis 
argued that “few periods can be better understood in the light of 
a frontier concept than western Europe between 800 and 1500 
A.D.” and urged historians to investigate these centuries “in the 
light of a frontier thesis.”50
47 Lawrence J. McCrank, “R. I. Burns as Ethnologist and Histo-
rian of the Old World and the New,” in Iberia and the Mediterra-
nean World of the Middle Ages, ed. P. Chevedden, D. Kagay, and 
P. Padilla (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1996), 2:20.
48 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier 
in American History,” (American Historical Association, 1894; 
Reprint, Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 2014), 3.
49 Burns himself, while rejecting the core of the thesis and 
admitting that Turner himself would be unlikely to recognize its 
various adaptations, nonetheless paid homage to it—not least in 
the title of his influential essay “The Significance of the Frontier in 
the Middle Ages,” in Medieval Frontier Societies, ed. Robert 
Bartlett and Angus MacKay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); 
quote at 309.
50 Archibald R. Lewis, “The Closing of the Medieval Frontier, 
1250-1350,” Speculum 33, no. 4 (1958): 475.
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It was this “neo-Turnerian” conception, along with a re-
definition of the frontier not as “free land” waiting to be 
claimed by whites but as “zones of intercultural contact,” that 
Burns drew upon in his own research.51 “The analogy of the 
colonial experience itself with those of the sixteenth and later 
centuries is clear,” he states in his 1984 magnum opus, 
Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of 
Valencia: “the seizure and control by a dominant alien minori-
ty, supported from the homeland, growing by steady immigra-
tion, disdainful and wary of the native population.”52 In 
numerous essays, and with extensive research into the “marvel-
ous and varied registers” of the conquering monarchs,53 Burns 
investigates the impact of these colonizers upon the social 
structure of the colonized in terms less of convivencia than of 
acculturation.  When Muslim society survived in Valencia, it 
was not because of enlightenment on the part of the Catholic 
conquerors; it was because of the resilience of the Muslim 
culture and its ability to “recrystallize” after the shock of 
contact.54 The coexistence and cooperation of Muslims, Jews, 
and Christians to which the archives attest “was not,” Burns
stresses, “tolerance.  Neither people would have conceded that 
our modern tolerance was a virtue; neither could have sympa-
51 Burns, “The Significance of the Frontier,” 310.
52 Robert I. Burns, SJ, Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the 
Crusader Kingdom of Valencia: Societies in Symbiosis
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), xviii.
53 Ibid., xv. Burns acknowledges that cross-cultural interactions 
were not written about directly; historians must come at the 
question through the “patient archeological probing” of official 
documents, which “tend to stress legal disabilities, tax collections, 
administrative interventions, religious tension, the chronique 
scandaleuse of the police blotter, and clashes at arms” (12).  In 
Muslims, Christians, and Jews these records include surrender 
documents, edicts and charters, and lawsuits—particularly those 
related to land ownership and boundary disputes (see 237-238).
54 Ibid., 50.
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thized with our secular-humanistic principles.  But it was a 
modus vivendi, an experience not without its human warmth 
and practical respect for irreconcilable difference.  And it 
provided an effective ground for unremitting cultural inter-
change.”55
Nor was Burns the only one to argue that questions of tol-
erance and intolerance, exclusion or convivencia were the 
wrong ones to ask.  In his influential 1977 work The Royal 
Treasure, John Boswell also approached the case of Muslims 
living under the Crown of Aragon through the untapped riches 
of royal archives. His focus, however, was on the mid-14th
century, and in his introduction Boswell defined his approach 
vis-à-vis an earlier work by Burns: 
His study [Islam under the Crusaders (1974)] is, there-
fore, one of a society just beginning to establish its in-
ternal organization; indeed, what primarily interests Fr. 
Burns is the mechanisms and dynamics of the estab-
lishment of Christian hegemony over a Muslim popula-
tion.  The following study, on the other hand, is an effort 
to examine the position of Muslims once this hegemony 
was securely in place, i.e., what life was like for an 
established dissident minority.56
Using royal letters, tax records, legal cases, and laws, Boswell 
sought to elucidate the “symbiosis” that existed between the 
Catholic monarchs of Aragon and their mudéjar subjects, and 
thus to “reconstruct” the “broken and crumpled spider’s web”
of convivencia.57
In Boswell’s view, however, it was critical that students of 
Spanish history not swing to extremes either of oppression or 
social harmony when considering this symbiotic relationship.  
55 Ibid., 51.
56 John Boswell, The Royal Treasure: Muslim Communities 
under the Crown of Aragon in the Fourteenth Century (Yale 
University Press, 1977), 18.
57 Ibid., 12.
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The case of the mudéjar was full of “paradoxes”58 and “contra-
dictions” that could not be understood by naively asking 
“whether Muslims were ‘well’ or ‘ill’ treated or whether the 
Christians of Aragon-Catalonia-Valencia were ‘kind’ or ‘cruel,’ 
‘tolerant’ or ‘intolerant.’”59 Rather, an exploration of shifting 
royal policies from monarch to monarch revealed that the 
mudéjars’ situation as a minority and their integration into the 
larger society were contingent upon such “historical factors” as
war, finance, demographics, and the whim of the ruling class, 
and differed from region to region.60 In Aragon, for instance, a 
long period of acculturation and a small mudéjar population 
may have allowed for a certain degree of “convivencia based on 
mutual acceptance and supra-ethnic loyalty.”61 By contrast, 
“co-existence between the ethnic groups in Valencia was 
simply that: co-existence.”62  The differences boiled down to 
socio-historical factors:
In no case could it be argued that the general situation of 
Muslims, whether desirable or undesirable, was due to 
the bigotry or tolerance of particular Christians, or to the 
enlightenment or fanaticism of the ruling classes, or to 
the justice or injustice of Christian authorities.  The 
situation of the Muslims and their relation to Christian 
society around them was created and maintained by 
organizational and structural forces which operate on 
most pluralistic societies, which respond to stress by 
exaggerating social distinctions and cleavages regardless 
of the desires or wishes of individuals involved, and 
which are better analyzed in terms of their effects than 
their moral desirability.63
58 Ibid., 21.
59 Ibid., 404.
60 Ibid., 405.
61 Ibid., 398-399.
62 Ibid., 400.
63 Ibid., 407.
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The top-down, institutional version of convivencia, stem-
ming more from Glick’s anthropological approach than from 
Castro’s idealist conception of the term, continued to be the 
dominant historiographical perspective through the duration of 
the 20th century.  Concurrently with Burns and Boswell, Elena 
Lourie published numerous essays on the situations of both 
Muslim and Jewish minorities in Aragon, including several that 
were reprinted in her 1990 collection Crusade and Colonisa-
tion: Muslims, Christians and Jews in Medieval Aragon.  The 
compendium also featured an original piece that examined the 
sometimes-contradictory, always-ambivalent attitude of the 
Aragonese monarchs toward their mudéjar population, which at 
once protected Muslims as an economically beneficial minority 
and excluded them from the Christian “communitas regni.”64
Like Burns, Lourie examined royal policy in newly conquered 
territories like Majorca and Valencia, looking in particular at 
the range of fiscal demands, from ransom payments to tax 
burdens, made of the Muslims; and like Boswell, she stressed 
the paradoxes of this supposed convivencia in which Muslims 
were distrusted by the Crown and hated by the populace, yet 
also sought after as colonists and granted royal protection.65
Also in the early 1990s, Mark Meyerson published his 
contribution to this popular field.  The Muslims of Valencia in 
the Age of Fernando and Isabel: Between Coexistence and 
Crusade returns to the Crown of Aragon in the waning years of 
convivencia as if to complete the trilogy begun by Burns and 
Boswell, this time in an effort “to comprehend more fully the 
reasons for the breakdown of convivencia, which for the most 
part occurred under the Catholic monarchs, Fernando and his 
64 Elena Lourie, “Anatomy of Ambivalence: Muslims under the 
Crown of Aragon in the Late Thirteenth Century,” in Crusade and 
Colonisation: Muslims, Christians and Jews in Medieval Aragon,
ed. Elena Lourie (Hampshire, UK: Variorum, 1990), 2.
65 Ibid., 76-77.
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wife, Isabel I of Castile.”66 Again, however, he cautions 
against a too rosy view of Spain prior to the rise of these 
remarkable rulers: “In both Islamic and Christian societies there 
existed a form of institutionalized tolerance of religious 
minorities.  Yet because this tolerance was institutional, an 
artificial governmental creation, it by no means guaranteed a 
harmonious intermingling of religious groups.”67 Indeed, he 
challenges the dichotomy inherent in his own title by pointing 
out the “latent ideological antagonism” embedded in the 
“institutional forms structuring Iberian Christian-Muslim-
Jewish coexistence”—the crusade ideology in the midst of 
coexistence, and the coexistence in the midst of crusade.68
Like Lourie, Meyerson sees the foundation of this tenuous 
“living together” as essentially economic, since all layers of 
Valencian society depended on the labor and taxes of these 
religious others.  “The Mudejars could not be extracted [from 
the economy] without the entire edifice crumbling,” he writes.  
“The fortunes of nobleman, cleric, and burgher were all linked, 
some more directly than others, to the Mudejars’ fate,” and for 
this reason the elite tended to resist any suggestion that Mus-
lims should be forced to convert or flee.69 Indeed, during the 
early part of his reign Ferdinand himself tended to follow in the 
footsteps of his “ambivalent” predecessors, being less con-
cerned with the religious purity of the land than with ensuring 
“that the Crown received as great a share as was possible of the 
economic benefits accruing from the Mudejars’ labor and 
enterprise.”70 Where Meyerson diverges from Lourie is on her 
66 Mark D. Meyerson, The Muslims of Valencia in the Age of 
Fernando and Isabel: Between Coexistence and Crusade 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); e-book version 
distributed by Michigan Publishing, University of Michigan 
Library, 4.
67 Ibid., 3.
68 Ibid., 4.
69 Ibid., 143-144.
70 Ibid., 270.
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sharp dichotomy between the attitude of the rulers toward the 
Muslims and that of their Christian subjects.  Armed with 
documents from the Archivo del Reino de Valencia that allow 
him to “explore some areas . . . that have been left largely 
untouched by scholars working in earlier centuries,”71 he shifts 
the historical perspective downward to the host of mundane 
economic transactions that took place outside the parameters of 
official decree.  In light of such data, he argues that, on the 
contrary, “the popular Christian view of the Mudejars did not 
differ substantially from that of the king.”72  Christians patron-
ized Muslim shops (the practice of purchasing meat from 
Muslim butchers became particularly contentious73), and vice 
versa; Muslim artisans bought materials from Christian 
suppliers, and vice versa; Muslims established credit with 
Christians, and vice versa.  
Just as economic considerations dictated royal policies, 
then, so in daily life the activities of buying and selling provid-
ed the counterweight to the religious exclusivism that might 
otherwise have brought latent antagonisms to the fore.74 “It 
was above all the daily interaction between Muslim and 
Christian in the workplace and the marketplace,” Meyerson 
stresses, “that lent stability to Muslim-Christian convivencia in 
Valencia, and allowed for the breakdown of some, although by 
no means all, of the social barriers between them.”75 Violence 
occasionally did break out due to “both religious hostility and 
economic resentment,” but so long as it was contained by the 
71 Ibid., 8.
72 Ibid., 271.
73 The manner in which animals were slaughtered had signifi-
cant religious implications, so that by the late 15th century laws 
were being passed forbidding Christians from purchasing meat 
from either Muslim or Jewish butchers.  The practice was appar-
ently ongoing, however, and continued to plague Ferdinand and 
the Inquisition.  See ibid., 47. 
74 Ibid., 99.
75 Ibid., 271.
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institutions set in place by Lourie’s ambivalent monarchs, 
“convivencia was able to persist, much as it always had, with a 
potentiality for ethnic violence.”76 Isolated incidents of 
persecutions, however brutal, need not have spelled the end.
These incidents take front and center stage in David 
Nirenberg’s 1996 Communities of Violence: Persecution of 
Minorities in the Middle Ages, a work which draws upon the 
pioneering scholarship of Natalie Zemon Davis in its fusion of 
social and cultural history.  Despite his subtitle, which review-
ers have criticized as misleadingly broad,77 Nirenberg focuses 
on the dynamics of “systemic” violence in southern France and 
Aragon: anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish crusades in 1320-1321; 
ritual “Holy Week” attacks on Jewish communities by their 
Christian neighbors; charges of miscegenation levelled against 
one group by another.  His approach, however, is markedly 
different from the tradition of Mudéjar scholarship: rather than 
asking questions regarding cultural diffusion, the evolution of 
social structures, or even the “experiences” of minorities, he 
comes to local and royal archives in order to explore the 
“functions and meanings of . . . violence within medieval 
societies.”78 Through this exploration, he questions a teleologi-
cal understanding of cross-cultural interactions and relative 
tolerance or persecution, not only in Spain, but in medieval 
Europe at large.  Societies like those in Aragon, he argues, did 
not degenerate from a state of interfaith harmony into bigotry 
and cataclysmic violence; on the contrary, not only eyewitness 
accounts of riots but also civic cases—in which minorities were 
76 Ibid., 272.
77 See, for example, Meyerson’s review, in which he com-
mends the book but questions the applicability of Nirenberg’s 
conclusions to regions on the other side of the Pyrenees.  Mark D. 
Meyerson, “Review: Communities of Violence: Persecution of 
Minorities in the Middle Ages,” Speculum 74, no. 2 (1999): 467.
78 David Nirenberg, Communities of Violence: Persecution of 
Minorities in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996), 15.
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habitually accused of such crimes as well-poisoning and 
miscegenation—reveal the fact that legal as well as physical 
violence was always embedded in society.  
Nirenberg’s argument does not seem far removed from the 
moderate stance of Burns or Meyerson, who stress that antago-
nisms were always present in the midst of convivencia; but 
whereas Meyerson focuses on the role of economic exchange in 
restraining that antagonism, Nirenberg contends that acts of 
violence themselves helped stabilize convivencia.79  In his 
chapter on “The Two Faces of Sacred Violence,” for instance, 
he makes the case that the ritual reenactment of Passion plays 
symbolically integrated Jews into Christian life at the same 
time that the ritual stoning of the call (the city’s Jewish quarter) 
reinforced the boundaries between the two.80 The rhythmic 
quality of these aggressive acts set the parameters within which 
coexistence could take place.  “Convivencia was predicated 
upon violence,” he unequivocally concludes; “it was not its 
peaceful antithesis.”81
Nirenberg’s work, with its focus on interpretation and 
meaning rather than large-scale social change or even small-
scale minority experiences, represents one of the most dramatic 
reinterpretations of Castro’s term to date.  More than simply 
79 Nirenberg cites approvingly Meyerson’s thesis of “the eco-
nomic foundations of convivencia,” but emphasizes (as Meyerson 
himself acknowledges) that “none of these [economic] relations 
need preclude violence or hatred.” Rather, such social networks 
“enmeshed moments of violence and gave them meaning” (Ibid., 
40).  
80 Ibid., 218.  Lucy K. Pick makes a similar argument regarding 
the use of polemical literature in maintaining convivencia in her 
Conflict and Coexistence: Archbishop Rodrigo and the Muslims 
and Jews of Medieval Spain (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press, 2004); in particular see page 3, where she cites 
Nirenberg and draws a parallel between physical violence and the 
verbal violence of religious polemics.
81 Nirenberg, Communities of Violence, 245.
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“scrap[ing] the varnish of romanticism off the old concept,” as
Soifer has put it,82 his thesis harkens back to Sánchez-
Albornoz’s more polemical critiques and throws the very 
applicability of the word convivencia into question.  Nirenberg 
himself sees “no reason why convivencia need designate only 
harmonious coexistence” and thus is willing to retain the term, 
so long as it is divested of any romantic overtones: one need not 
throw out the baby with the bathwater, his work implies.83
Soifer, however, is not the only recent historian to believe 
Nirenberg did not go far enough in his analysis: Brian Catlos 
repudiates convivencia altogether in his 2004 The Victors and 
the Vanquished.  In some ways this work, which examines “the 
period in which mudéjar society was born and matured” in 
Catalonia and Aragon,84 harkens back to Mudéjar studies; he 
nods to his illustrious predecessors and places himself in their 
“socio-anthropological tradition,”85 adopting a macro-historical 
approach toward the adaptations of Muslim institutions—
financial, ideological, and administrative—to the “trauma” of 
conquest.86  If anything, his work is even more exhaustive in 
82 Soifer, “Beyond Convivencia,” 22.  Soifer is ultimately un-
impressed with Nirenberg’s approach, arguing that it posits 
convivencia as a “balancing act” maintained by “an indeterminate 
mechanism that infuses social reality with just the right amount of 
antagonism and toleration, somehow keeping the whole system in 
check.  What it does not even attempt to answer is where the 
hostility and the need for cooperation come from, and how the 
desirable balance is achieved” (23).  This seems, however, to be an 
oversimplification of historians like Nirenberg or Meyerson, who 
are very much interested in the mechanisms whereby convivencia 
was maintained.
83 Nirenberg, Communities of Violence, 8.
84 Brian A. Catlos, The Victors and the Vanquished: Christians 
and Muslims of Catalonia and Aragon, 1050-1300 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5.
85 Ibid., 8.
86 Ibid., 323.
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analyzing law codes, court cases, and tax records in order to 
understand the degree to which Muslims were integrated into 
the conquering society.  He acknowledges that “no such study 
of a minority community can be complete . . . without endeav-
oring to understand how individuals were affected,” and thus 
concludes his work with a series of six microhistories that focus 
on the dynamics of inter-cultural exchange at the local level. 
Yet these case studies—unlike Meyerson’s review of economic 
transactions or Nirenberg’s examination of ritual violence—are 
primarily administrative, and are in fact less concerned with the 
experience of individual mudéjar than with the relationship 
between the judicial systems of the conquerors and of the 
conquered.87
This relationship, he concludes, could be relatively symbi-
otic despite its many tensions.  He is reluctant, however, to call 
the symbiosis convivencia, a term he refers to in a more recent 
work as “flawed and nebulous”88 and associates with a false 
and anachronistic belief in a tolerant Spain.  In an almost 
verbatim endorsement of Burns’ thesis, he observes that “the 
liberties which [the mudéjar] enjoyed did not result from an 
impulse of ‘tolerance’ on the part of the count-kings—this is a 
concept which is hardly regarded as a virtue today and was 
certainly not in the thirteenth century.”89 Rather, individual 
Christians and Muslims (and, by extension, Jews) must be 
understood as operating within a number of social spheres in 
addition to the religious, any of which could dictate the terms of 
social interaction at a given time—sometimes violent, some-
87 Ibid., 261.  The first three case studies each focus on a par-
ticular litigation involving tax exemption or a land dispute; the last 
three deal with particular officials, Muslim or Christian, in order to 
elucidate the performance of local administrations.  
88 Brian A. Catlos, Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom, c. 
1050-1614 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 89.
89 Catlos, Victors and Vanquished, 321.
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times amicable.90  At all times, however, this interaction was 
dependent upon numerous pragmatic factors.  Catlos even 
coined a new word for it: conveniencia rather than the too 
idyllic convivencia.91
“Catlos,” Soifer notes with what might be approval and 
might be derision, “cuts through the Gordian knot of issues 
surrounding convivencia by rejecting it altogether.”92 Yet it 
appears that Catlos, in his effort to distance himself as much as 
possible from associations like Nightingale’s, has created with 
conveniencia a view of medieval Spain as problematic as that 
generated by convivencia.  Where the latter may be accused of 
overstating ideology and thus minimizing the pragmatic 
calculations involved in coexistence, Catlos’ new term risks 
overstating pragmatics and dismissing altogether the ideologi-
cal underpinnings for the practice of tolerance in the medieval 
90 Ibid., 389.  A similar argument is put forward by Jonathan 
Ray, who argues that convivencia should be reassessed from the 
perspective of the minorities themselves (in Ray’s case, this 
minority is the Jews rather than the Muslims).  Like Catlos, Ray 
contends that Jews possessed a multiplicity of identities that went 
beyond the religious and shaped their social lives.  Thus, “rather 
than continue to discuss this [medieval Spanish] society in terms 
of religious communities, it might be more profitable to view it as 
a product of a variety of contending identities and social, cultural, 
and religious tensions that existed between the individual and a 
number of possible groups” (Jonathan Ray, “Beyond Tolerance 
and Persecution: Reassessing Our Approach to Medieval Con-
vivencia,” Jewish Social Studies 11, no. 2 (2005): 13).  Neverthe-
less, Ray sees this approach as returning convivencia to its roots 
and gives no indication of wishing to see the term jettisoned (1). 
91 Catlos, Victors and Vanquished, 407.  Catlos expands some-
what upon his own term in Muslims of Medieval Latin Christen-
dom; see pages 521-522 in particular.
92 Soifer, “Beyond Convivencia,” 24.
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period.93 Hillgarth might call conveniencia a new myth, 
important in its critique of the more romantic notions associated 
with convivencia, but nonetheless incapable of presenting a full 
picture of the dynamics of medieval Spain.
And this is, perhaps, at the heart of the convivencia cri-
tique: it fails to capture historical reality.  As conjured by 
Nightingale, with its burden of wonder and nostalgia for what 
another popular author has called “A Vanished World,”94 it can 
even distort that reality.  On the other hand, the responsibility 
for these distortions cannot all be laid, as Soifer seems inclined 
to lay them, at the door of convivencia, for scholars like Glick, 
Boswell, and Nirenberg attest to the fact that the “nuts-and-
bolts explorations of interfaith existence” that she craves can be 
made without rejecting the term.95 Rather, the misrepresenta-
tions spring from the complexities, ambiguities, and apparent 
contradictions of medieval Spanish society itself.  Medieval 
Spain cannot be summed up in a single word, whether that 
word be convivencia or conveniencia, for each was present in 
93 Pragmatism may indeed have been the largest single factor in 
the case of Spain.  Over the last several decades, however, there 
has been a historiographical reaction against the too rapid dismis-
sal of “tolerance as a medieval virtue,” and there are many who 
would question Burns’, Boswell’s, or Catlos’ claims that to speak 
in terms of toleration is anachronistic.  See, for instance, John 
Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman (eds.), Beyond the 
Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlighten-
ment (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998); also 
István Bejczy, “Tolerantia: A Medieval Concept,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 58, no. 3 (1997): 365-84.
94 Chris Lowney, A Vanished World: Medieval Spain’s Golden 
Age of Enlightenment (New York: Free Press, 2005).  Lowney’s 
post-9/11 book is heavily influenced by contemporary issues, and 
is suffused, even more than Nightingale’s Granada, with a 
despairing nostalgia for the “common society” that medieval Spain 
almost attained (see p. 14).
95 Soifer, “Beyond Convivencia,” 31.
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different ways and at different times; popular and scholarly 
treatments of the era from Catlos to Nightingale are thus most 
problematic not when they employ a particular term, but when 
they attempt to use a single paradigm to the exclusion of all 
others.  Novikoff, who refers to the debate as an “historiograph-
ical enigma” and seems uncertain what to make of it, nonethe-
less acknowledges this point: “The contrasting images one is 
presented with” in scholars’ reinterpretations of convivencia 
“are themselves evidence of a world more varied, more 
changing, and more complex than any overarching concept or 
generality can convey.”96
Paradoxically, that has been the charm of convivencia
since 1948.  It suggests more than it tells, and its tantalizing 
suggestions have continually fueled research—by those who 
reject it as well as by those who accept it.  What was conviven-
cia?  How was there coexistence?  Was there tolerance, or is 
tolerance the wrong frame to use?  What made Spain unique, or 
was Spain unique at all?  What motivated the rulers, and what 
motivated the common folk in their daily life?  Was society 
harmonious or conflictive, or are the two mutually exclusive?  
Convivencia has not stopped the questions being asked, nor has 
it hindered scholars from proposing thoughtful answers.  If it is 
a myth, it nevertheless seems to be a more fruitful one than 
Soifer has given it credit for—Nightingale’s new book notwith-
standing.
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REBUILDING GERMANY’S CHILDREN:
THE NAZI INDOCTRINATION AND 
POSTWAR REEDUCATION OF THE 
HITLER YOUTH
Elizabeth Fox 
Introduction
On May 8, 1945, as the Allies advanced deep into German 
territory, the Third Reich disintegrated. In the aftermath of 
World War II, the horrors of the Nazi dictatorship were fully 
exposed when the Nazi political foundations finally crumbled, 
reflecting the wreckage of most German cities, such as Berlin. 
German civilians were left to rebuild their country, their lives,
and the German psyche.  As they looked upon the debris of 
their homes and towns, the Germans were traumatized, lost, and 
helpless; the once proud and mighty Nazi national identity was 
shattered.  As a result, they turned to the German youth 
population to shoulder the great burdens of reconstruction, the 
majority of whom had participated in the Hitler Youth and were 
also psychologically devastated and lost. Günter Grass, former 
Hitler Youth member of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frunds-
berg, once reflected on having been in the Hitler Youth 
generation of Germany, noting that he felt “too young to have 
been a Nazi, but old enough to have been formed by the Nazi 
regime.”1 Despite having been formerly molded and shaped by 
Nazi indoctrination, Germany’s youth became the best hope for 
1 Quoted in Jan-Werner Müller, Another Country: German 
Intellectuals, Unification and National Identity (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000), 10.  
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the future and, through reeducation and democratization, the 
means through which Nazi principles could be extricated from 
the German consciousness. In the author’s opinion, the ac-
counts of former Hitler Youth members and other German 
adolescents do, in fact, attest to the shift towards democratiza-
tion.  One of the postwar tasks at hand was the reconstruction 
of the German ideology, especially that of the youth, to enable 
this formerly proud people to come to terms with events during 
the war and how best to move forward.  The rebuilding of 
Germany’s children was the daunting mission facing the Allies 
and German citizens.
This essay will examine the success or failure of democra-
tization in Germany after World War II through an examination 
of postwar memoirs of former Hitler Youth members, as well 
as an oral history interview with a former member, Erich 
Neumeier [Fig. 1].  It explores whether or not those who looked 
back on their participation in the Hitler Youth continued to base 
their lives on the Nazi ideals with which they had been in-
doctrinated or if their reeducation during the rebuilding of 
Germany after World War II was a success. While the brain-
washing of German adolescents was accomplished through the 
regime’s schooling, physical training, and Fascist pageantry of 
the Hitler Youth organization, this essay will argue that the 
ultimate disintegration of Germany at the end of the war and in 
the postwar period, combined with the Allied efforts at postwar 
reeducation and democratization, successfully influenced a shift 
away from Nazi ideals; the formerly indoctrinated youth were 
the first to be influenced.  In the wake of the indisputable 
failure and disillusionment of the Germans, Nazi principles 
simply could not withstand the impending wave of democracy 
that began to affect postwar Germany.  
Notes on the Evidence
In order to discuss contextually the Hitler Youth and the 
Allied postwar reeducation in Germany, one must describe the 
methodology undergirding the evidence used in this essay. The
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Figure 1. Portion of Erich Neumeier Interview, page 1. 
Conducted on April 6, 2016.
majority of primary and secondary sources provide comprehen-
sive histories on how both the processes of Nazi indoctrination 
and Allied postwar reeducation policies shaped the ideologies 
of German youths. However, various historical accounts have 
placed little emphasis on critically evaluating the postwar 
memories of former Nazi youths. Debates on whether democra-
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tization was extremely successful have occurred amongst 
historians. When discussing studies made by German scholars 
such as James Tent decades after the postwar period, historian 
Jaimey Fisher claims they did not grasp the impact of reeduca-
tion in its cultural and social context; instead “these studies 
generally focus on (re)educational policy and neglect the wider 
public sphere debates about generation and ‘the German youth’ 
as well as their consequences for German culture and national 
identity more generally.”2 Konrad Jarausch also agrees with 
Fisher that postwar discussion and analysis have in the past 
focused on the history rather than addressing the question of 
democratization. He argues that the problematic aspects of the 
entire process were largely ignored by Whig history, which 
emphasized the optimistic long-term success (albeit a signifi-
cant aspect of democratization) rather than perspectives of the 
process at the time.3 With respect to the views of these histori-
ans, attempts will be made to trace what democratization meant 
to German youths by analyzing the memories and perceptions 
of former Hitler Youth members. 
The methodology in this essay places primary importance 
upon tracing the postwar memory of German youths and 
creating a thoughtful analysis of their narratives. The problem 
underlying most of these postwar memories, mainly those of 
Erich Neumeier, is their silence concerning their participation 
in furthering the Nazi cause as Hitler Youth members, as well 
as their roles and thoughts during the democratization process 
that transformed post-1945 Germany. For instance, in my 
interviews with Neumeier, not once did he comment on Hitler, 
anti-Semitism, or the treatment of the Jews. Former Hitler 
Youth members such as Neumeier, Alfons Heck, and Günter 
2 Jaimey Fisher, Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation, 
and Reconstruction After the Second World War (Detriot: Wayne 
State University Press, 2007), 15. 
3 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 
1945-1995, trans. Brandon Hunziker (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 131.
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Grass indicate that they viewed their experience in the youth 
organizations as times of social fellowship, rather than Nazi 
indoctrination; this leads to the question, in Neumeier’s case at 
least, whether or not his silence is possibly still a remnant of 
postwar guilt, shame, and denial manifesting itself. A number 
of sociological studies have deeply analyzed the problem of 
silence that afflicted postwar Germany regarding Nazi atroci-
ties. In the article “Towards a Science of Silence: The Conse-
quences of Leaving a Memory Unsaid,” this type of postwar 
silence is termed by sociologists as mnemonic silence, meaning 
“the absence of expressing a memory,” whether intentional or 
unintentional, overt or covert.4 It shows that silence sometimes 
does not mean actual forgetting but the act of trying to forget. 
The article categorizes this silence as “refusing to remember 
overtly while remembering covertly”; and it is perhaps done by 
Neumeier as he is justifying his Hitler Youth experience and 
innocence as a young naïve man who never got to fully 
participate in democratization due to his move to America. In 
this category, deception can be involved, but the motivations in 
refusing to remember can occur because “speakers are tuning 
what they say to the perceived attitudes or expectations of their 
audience, articulating some aspects of their memory while 
leaving others unmentioned.”5 The article also mentions the 
rebound effect, in which intentional silences may not elicit 
greater forgetting, but ironically “can actually make speakers 
more likely to remember the suppressed material in the future 
4 Charles B. Stone, et al., “Towards a Science of Silence: The 
Consequences of Leaving a Memory Unsaid,” Perspectives on 
Psychological Science 7, no. 1 (2012): 39. 
5 Ibid., 41. While I do not doubt Neumeier gave a true account 
of his life in the Hitler Youth based on what he experienced and 
perceived as a young boy (since he was not mature enough to 
realize the consequences of his participation), it is possible that he 
failed to acknowledge or willingly admit how he felt about Nazi 
indoctrination in the Hitler Youth after decades of realizing the 
extent of Nazi atrocities. 
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rather than to forget it.”6 This explains how postwar accounts 
like those of Alfons Heck and Günter Grass are created and 
analyzed years after the postwar period, the time when they 
remained silent in order to focus on finding stability in post-
WWII Germany.  Sociologists Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger 
similarly argue that “the passage of time may in itself increase 
the probability of finding [overt] silence as witnesses pass away 
or grow old, and collectives grow bored or tired.”7 Silence
according to them is a coping mechanism for acknowledging 
and remembering the past. Thus, former Nazi German youths 
have recently sought to recollect and write down their postwar 
experiences years later, as a way of at least claiming some 
responsibility for their actions—”keeping completely silent 
about certain issues is increasingly becoming a non-option for 
many nations [i.e. Germany].”8 Overall, these sources, includ-
ing the new interview, further this essay’s analysis of how 
postwar memory is analyzed in terms of the history of the 
Hitler Youth and the democratization process in post-1945
Germany. 
Hitler Youth Background and Indoctrination
In 1926, Nazi politician Kurt Gruber successfully re-
vamped Hitler’s official youth organization led by Baldur von
Shirach, giving it the title Hitlerjugend. The activities and 
involvement of the Hitler Youth can be summarized in three 
main goals: “to mobilize and to discipline an entire generation 
of German youth in the spirit of National Socialism; to loosen 
6 Ibid., 44.
7 Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Chana Teeger, “Unpacking the 
Unspoken: Silence in Collective Memory and Forgetting,” Social 
Forces 88, no. 3 (March 2010): 1110. 
8 Ibid., 1104.
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their ties to the Church, the family, and the past; to inculcate the 
ideal that the State was everything and the individual nothing.”9
The Hitler Youth can be described as a social organization 
with activities that required physical fitness and military 
instruction. This obligation involved participation in athletic 
games, which indirectly introduced youth to actual military 
operations and strategies. In an oral interview conducted by this 
author, Erich Neumeier, a former member of both the Jungvolk 
and the Hitlerjugend, stated that he remembered participating in 
sports activities as well as constructing and flying gliders.  In 
his written description, he compares his time in both organiza-
tions, which he claimed were similar to the Boy Scouts10:
I was in the young volk at 10 years, Hitler Youth at 14 
years.  Nearly 95% joined both organizations.  When 
you wanted to belong, you joined.  I did not have a rank.  
I was just a member.  In young volk, we had weekly 
meeting, had sport [running, jumping] and building 
moder [model] glider airplanes. . . . I did not feel that I 
was weaned from my family.  
I joined the “pilot” Hitler Youth section.  My fondest 
memory were learn how to fly a glider. . . . I liked to fly 
tremendously.  There were other sections of Hitler 
Youth; . . . you were free to choose your group after 
changing from young volk to Hitler Youth at 14 years.11
9 Craig W.H. Luther, Blood and Honor: The History of the 12th
SS Panzer Division, “Hitler Youth,” 1943-1945 (San Jose: R. 
James Bender Publishing, 1987), 13. 
10 Erich Neumeier, interviewed by Elizabeth Fox, April 6, 
2016, 1. Neumeier was born in 1927 in Ingolstadt, Germany just 
outside of Munich on the Danube River. This interview represents 
a credible account of his experiences in and perceptions of the 
Hitler Youth before and during the war, as well as his perception 
of the postwar reconstruction, democratization, and reeducation 
process. Neumeier is a friend of Elizabeth’s grandfather.
11 Ibid., 1-2.
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In essence, the Hitlerjugend became an important organi-
zation that indirectly trained these young men into becoming 
Nazi soldiers and fighting machines. The Nazi Schutzstaffel
(Elite Guard or SS) was primarily responsible for supporting 
and recruiting young boys from the Hitler Youth, serving as a 
connection for members, and, in fact, manipulating them to 
enter into SS positions. The SS “fed its insatiable thirst for 
power and its penetration into the collective mind and social 
fabric by replenishing its personnel from the politically condi-
tioned HJ [Hitlerjugend].”12
The Hitler Youth’s education on Nazi principles became 
the quintessential foundation of the organization that shaped the 
activities and training of its members. In addition to teaching 
about the race and ideologies of enemies, such as Jews and 
Communists, instruction emphasized German history (from its 
modern history in 1871 up to the humiliating end of World War 
I) and the life of Hitler.  Their most important handbook, which 
gave an overview of those Nazi principles, was entitled The 
Nazi Primer; in it, the goals of the Hitler Youth (“character 
building, physical training, and training in the National Social-
ist worldview”) clearly echoed the ideals emphasized by Nazi 
leadership.13 The Primer outlined complex ideas pertaining to 
German population and culture that are ultra-nationalist in 
attitude.  For instance, the Primer emphasized the need for 
racial purification in the German community, which was 
presently in danger of creating impure variations in races (or 
“hybrids”)—therefore, “a Jew who, during the ‘System Time,’ 
has assumed a German name and adopted the Christian belief is 
and remains a Jew.”14 In this way, it advocated for the preserva-
12 Gerhard Rempel, Hitler’s Children: The Hitler Youth and the 
SS (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 257.
13 Harwood L. Childs (trans.), William E. Dodd (comm.), The 
Nazi Primer: Official Handbook for Schooling the Hitler Youth
(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1938), xix. 
14 Ibid., 13. “System time” refers to the period of the Weimar 
Republic between 1918 and 1933.
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tion of the Aryan race, the most perfect civilization in the 
world, from mixed, abnormal peoples like the Jews, who seek 
to corrupt them and the natural order of the universe. This racial 
concept was a hidden rejection of democracy that instead 
upheld National Socialism as a suitable ideology in creating the 
pure, rather than individualistic, German state. William E. 
Dodd, the former U.S. ambassador to Germany from 1933-
1937, effectively summarized the overall significance of this 
indoctrination as “preparing the way for a Nazified world 
where all freedom of the individual, of education, and of the 
churches is to be totally suppressed.”15
These Nazi ideals were espoused by the German youth 
who separated themselves from their traditionally conservative 
moral guides—namely the church, school, and family unit. 
Thus, the Hitler Youth became a modern organization that 
appealed to independent young minds, as autonomy was 
granted to them as well as the “opportunity for young people to 
be respected and responsible.”16 For example, parental consent 
was not required to join the SS Panzer Division or the Hitler 
Youth.  Additionally, membership into these organizations 
eventually became mandatory, breaching the voice of parental 
authority and replacing it with that of the State in the guise of 
youthful rights of independence.  This sparked an intergenera-
tional conflict, specifically between the older generation of the 
Weimar Republic and the new, young generation of Nazis. A
former enthusiastic member of the Hitlerjugend, Alfons Heck, 
was driven to the Hitler Youth organization as a ten-year-old 
due to his “crav[ing] for action” and for freedom from respon-
sibilities.17 Similarly, devoted Jungvolk member Eberhard 
15 Ibid., 280.
16 Michael H. Kater, Hitler Youth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 1.  
17 Alfons Heck, A Child of Hitler: Germany in the Days When 
God Wore a Swastika (Phoenix: Renaissance House Publishers, 
1985), 9.  
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Weinbrenner learned from his teacher that “by resisting his 
parents he exhibited true Heldenmut [heroic courage].”18
The Hitler Youth also promoted itself as an organization of 
opportunity for all those of different backgrounds. The organi-
zation’s members were rewarded based on merit rather than 
social standing. In their immaturity, selfishness, and ignorance, 
these young boys sought power and strength over other children 
as they attempted to climb the ranks in their organization and 
be rewarded for their military and athletic prowess. In spite of 
this desire for Nazi power and leadership, the majority of the 
Hitler Youth, primarily its youngest members, were attracted to 
join the organization for the camaraderie and Fascist pageantry, 
normalizing the organization and its purpose. During his time in 
the Hitler Youth, Günter Grass reveled in this youthful fellow-
ship without question: “The wishful thought of [the Hitler 
Youth] slogan, Youth Must Be Led by Youth! was backed by 
promises of overnight hikes and other outdoor activities in the 
woods along the beach.”19 Erich Neumeier claimed that he had 
“a happy childhood, playing soocker [sic], swimming in the 
Danube, exploring the neighborhood park. . . .  As a young boy, 
I heard from my father, actually just good news.  My father had 
work, our family had more than enough to eat.  Germany was 
rising industrulic [sic].  I would say [I was] happy and proud to 
be a glider training pilot [in the Hitler Youth].” 20 Neumeier 
further expressed his disinterest in Nazi politics during his 
times in the Jungvolk and Hitler Youth, commenting on the fact 
that he never discovered the negative aspects of Nazism (i.e. 
18 Frederic C. Tubach, German Voices: Memories of Life Dur-
ing Hitler’s Third Reich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2011), 106. Weinbrenner had frequently rebelled from his 
Protestant parents, who were opposed to National Socialism, 
another example of intergenerational conflict.
19 Günter Grass, Peeling the Onion, trans. Michael Henry Heim 
(Orlando: A Harvest Book, Harcourt, Inc., 2007), 20. 
20 Neumeier, “Interview,” 2.
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anti-Semitism).21 To most German youths, their required duty 
as German citizens was to participate in the Hitler Youth—
there was no scrutiny of their actions since they did not 
understand the hidden political implications of the Nazism they 
naively practiced. In essence, as Alfons Heck reflected, 
“Children are too immature to question the veracity of what 
they are taught by their educators.”22 Like many of his peers, 
Neumeier did not fully realize the implications of his actions, 
but was just happy to be a child who “belonged” in a social 
organization. This illustrates the brilliance of the Nazi estab-
lishment in indoctrinating youth.  
Other postwar accounts reveal the realistic tensions of 
participation in the organization. Ilse Koehn, a former member 
of the German Girl’s League, Jungmaedel, faced hardships in 
her organization, providing a different story regarding her 
involvement as a half-Jewish girl in the Hitler Youth. Koehn’s 
identity as a Mischling (mixed-blood) was a hidden but 
common situation amongst other former members. In a classi-
fied document titled “Expulsion of A Mischlinge from the 
Hitler Youth” from the Archives of the Wiener Library in 
London, correspondence and orders from the Chief of the 
NDSAP Personnel Office detail the investigation into whether 
or not the two sons of Hildegard Becker should continue 
membership in the Hitler Youth when it was discovered while 
undergoing divorce proceedings that Becker’s mother had a 
Jewish identity.23 In spite of Becker’s declaration that she was 
only half-Jewish and that she “obviously tried hard to prevent 
expulsion of her sons,” the NDSAP officials rejected the boys’ 
21 Ibid. 
22 Heck, Child of Hitler, 3. 
23 “Expulsion of a Mischlinge From The Hitler Youth. The 
'Final Solution' (September 1939-May 1945): 'Mischlinge', Mixed 
Marriages, Non-Aryans, Racial Disgrace. Eyewitness Accounts.”
July 1938 to January 1939. Archives of the Wiener Library, 
London. The Wiener Library, London, United Kingdom. Archives 
Unbound. Web. 15 Mar. 2016.
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continued membership in the Hitler Youth, “even if they were 
only 1/8 part Jewish.”24 The situation with Becker and her sons 
reflects the danger of being discovered, even with the smallest 
remnants of Jewish ancestry.  Such threat of discovery could 
affect the most loyal Hitler Youth members, as seen in the fear 
of Ilse Koehn and her family. Koehn joined the Jungmaedel
because her friends had told her “how much fun they had, 
singing and playing all kinds of games”; the real function of 
these activities, however, was to instruct these girls on Nazi 
philosophy. 25 In one harsh situation, Koehn was forced along 
with thousands of Berlin children to evacuate to East Prussia, 
when in fact they were sent to Czechoslovakia without the 
knowledge of their families; there, Hitler Youth dignitaries, 
including Baldur von Schirach, welcomed them.26 These girls 
were told to lie in their letters to their parents that they were 
safely secure in their area when in actuality they lived in cruel, 
strict, and unfair conditions. This situation focused on forming 
the German boys and girls into effective Nazi leaders who 
should follow orders regardless of the circumstances. 
Overall, while the Hitler Youth organizations had success 
in the indoctrination of the youth toward Nazism, it was later 
discovered that there were hidden tensions that were revealed in 
the aftermath of the war. Many children were affected by the 
cruel, unjust exploitation of the Hitler Youth organization. As 
Gerhard Rempel remarks, members of the Hitler Youth were “a
generation of misguided idealists. Hitler’s children demonstrat-
ed a youthful capacity for fidelity. That loyalty was abused.”27
The transformative experiences and continuous blind loyalty of 
the Hitler Youth members to the Third Reich was put to the test 
when democratization took control of Germany in the postwar 
period. 
24 Ibid.
25 Ilse Koehn, Mischling, Second Degree: My Childhood in 
Germany (New York: Greenwillow Books, 1977), 8.  
26 Ibid., 47. 
27 Rempel, Hitler’s Children, 262.
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Stages of Reeducation: 
Demilitarization, Denazification, Democratization
The collapse of Nazi Germany in 1945 abruptly ended Na-
zi indoctrination. In an attempt to salvage the remnants of 
German society and reduce the long-term trauma felt by the 
German population, the Allies implemented stages for what 
they hoped would be successful reeducation leading to democ-
ratization. The Allies targeted the youth as the bulwark upon 
which Western Germany (also the subsequent new Bonn 
Republic) could reconstruct and once again be successfully 
integrated into Western society. The phase of demilitarization 
divided Germany into zones controlled by the United States, 
Great Britain, France, and Russia. Under foreign Allied 
occupation, Germany was required to eliminate Nazi military 
organizations like the Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS, and Volkssturm
militia. German soldiers willingly underwent this demilitariza-
tion process for “fear of being captured, especially by the 
Russians, as well as the urge to make their way home unrecog-
nized.”28 This act of capitulation largely contrasted with the 
Nazi militant values and mindset of the Hitler Youth, marking 
the first turn for many from militarization to civility. 
Denazification became an essential phase in eradicating 
Nazi organizations and culture that contained elements of 
Fascism. In October 1945, the Allied Control Council issued its 
eighth law providing legal ramifications for denazification 
measures. These measures effectively “dissolved the 
N.D.S.A.P., its formations, and its affiliated organizations, of 
which some sixty-two were enumerated, making it illegal to 
revive the Party, either under its old name or a new one, and 
providing for the confiscation of the Party’s assets, property, 
28 Jarausch, After Hitler, 23.  The Germans also desired to have 
a normal and peaceful civilian life when leaving the frontlines, 
which made disarmament and demobilization easier. 
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files and documents.”29 Additionally, German businesses and 
industries were “prohibited from employing former Party 
Members in any but the lowest positions,” in order to remove 
former members from professional society and reduce their 
influence.30 Censorship was also placed on Nazi films, newspa-
pers, and other media, gradually becoming replaced by its 
American alternatives, such as the newspaper Die Neue 
Zeitung. One specific Allied attempt of censorship occurred in 
German cinema, in which a 1951 film titled Die Sünderin (The 
Sinner) in 1951 told the story of a woman who resorts to 
prostitution and later commits suicide.31 The film provoked 
uproar in the Protestant and Catholic churches that protested 
against the film’s immoral themes. Through such critical
involvement, the church, once a traditional enemy of the Hitler 
Youth, became an institutional authority whose mission was to 
help rebuild postwar Germany based on conservative values. 
As a result, “by the beginning of the Bonn Republic, these well-
entrenched interests dominated the process of social and 
cultural reconstruction.”32
Although the majority of Nazi control was effectively 
eliminated, historian Konrad Jarausch argues that denazifica-
tion was largely unsuccessful in the short term. Denazification
boards failed to eradicate most former Nazis from professional 
life, which, to be sure, was a difficult and impractical goal to 
attain in the short term; they also failed to convince them of 
29 “Europe 1945: Number 2: Germany Under Allied Occupa-
tion (As Mirrored In The German Press). Wiener Library Publica-
tions,” October to December 1945 (Archives of the Wiener
Library, London, The Wiener Library, London, United Kingdom), 
Archives Unbound, 4. 
30 Ibid.
31 Heidi Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany: 
Reconstructing National Identity After Hitler (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 92. 
32 Ibid., 93.
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their collective responsibility in the Holocaust.33 The bureau-
cratic process of removing ardent Nazis from officer positions 
and finding new appropriate officers was slow and unpopular 
amongst the German masses. One mayor in Hamburg claimed 
that removing former Nazi and SS members would lead to a 
“class of disgruntled and sacked ex-Party members” that would 
be “dangerous, ill-advised and a threat to law and order”; he 
also rejected “employment of proven anti-Fascists and former 
concentration camp inmates as contrary to the best interests of 
democratic administration.”34 In spite of such claims and initial 
backlash, local governments, primarily in West Germany, 
underwent tremendous efforts to purge Nazis from society and 
carry out their own programs of denazification. The denazifica-
tion processes differed with regards to Soviet-controlled areas 
versus those of the Western Allies—the Soviets using their own 
brand of indoctrination and brutality—but such processes were 
underway in all areas of Germany. 
Democratization benefited from the reeducation of the 
postwar German youth, primarily through the reorganization of 
the schools. Upon their reopening, schools faced problems such 
as the lack of textbooks approved to replace those that empha-
sized Nazi propaganda, like The Nazi Primer. In addition, when 
observing literacy and general knowledge, it became apparent 
that the German children lacked the proper education due to the 
former emphasis placed on Nazi indoctrination rather than on 
core teachings. Further, democratization required qualified 
teachers who were not former Nazi Party members:
In view of the great political responsibility towards the 
German youth and future, the prospective teachers are 
required—and this point is expressively stressed by the 
TÄGLICHE RUNDSCHAU, the paper of the Soviet 
command—to belong to those classes of the German 
masses that are known for their democratic traditions 
33 Jarausch, After Hitler, 54. 
34 “Europe 1945: Number 2,” 5.
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and leanings, namely the workers, the peasants and the 
working intelligentsia.35
The brutal stages of demilitarization, denazification, and 
democratization reflect the long, arduous process of recon-
structing Germany to overcome the brainwashing and indoctri-
nation employed by the Nazi Regime in their attempt to control 
all aspects of German society. 
Responses to Reeducation: Tracing Postwar Memory
The main problem in analyzing postwar memory is the si-
lence of many Germans during the democratization process 
extending into the 1950s and 1960s. Author Joachim Fest 
admitted that he would not have immediately put pen to paper, 
writing his precise early memories, if he had not had a radio 
commission to author his account of German history.36 In 
collectively working through his experiences, Fest termed the 
post-1945 period as “The Great Denial,” in which the “early 
years after the war was later described as a ‘communicative 
silence.’”37 This silence was formed not because of repression 
by the Allied forces but because of Germany’s determination to 
forget the horrors of their recent past. According to Tubach, 
“For mere physical and psychological survival, it was necessary 
for us to look forward; to look back meant facing a wall too 
high and formidable to be scaled.”38
Following World War II, German youths, especially older 
Hitler Youth members born before 1930, had become disorient-
ed by the reality of National Socialism and its subsequent 
destruction of Germany. Amidst the rubble and dilapidated 
towns of Germany, they felt lost without the Nazi authoritarian 
35 “Europe 1945: Number 2,” 29.
36 Joachim C. Fest, Not Me: Memoirs of a German Childhood,
trans. Martin Chalmers (London: Atlantic Books Ltd., 2012), 14.
37 Ibid., 354.
38 Tubach, German Voices, 100-101.
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ideology in which they were raised. Therefore, when the 
occupied German state was in the beginning stages of its 
democratic transformation, German youths actually protested 
against democratization. Initially, many of these adolescents 
remained loyal to the Führer and to National Socialism, 
believing that democracy would fail like it had with the Weimar 
Republic. Their resistance is evidence that actions in denazifi-
cation were ineffectively carried out in the beginning of the 
postwar period. Having been traumatized by the war, these 
youths clung to the ideals of Nazism, unwilling to admit their 
defeat.  The indoctrinated youths continued to claim in the 
summer of 1945, “Hitler was a great man who insisted that 
‘[Germans] have not really lost the war.’”39
Proud, nationalistic German youths sought to fight against 
Allied control. They believed the American occupiers threat-
ened to change the traditional social and political structures of 
German society and replace them with Americanized versions.  
Fisher states that there was contention between the Germans 
and Americans over Allied educational reforms that Germans 
believed would intrude upon other societal aspects of the 
German identity.  Drawing upon the American “Zook” Report, 
Fisher explains that Germans strongly protested proposed 
changes in the structure of German schools based on the 
American democratic model; this revealed “how youth and 
education afforded postwar Germans one last front on which to 
fight the Allies and on which to stake their identities.”40 The 
youthful resentment against this Allied control is also reflected 
by surveys in the U.S. zone.  The majority of Germans opposed 
denazification “in practice, most often because they felt that too 
many ‘small fish’ were being netted while the bigger ones were 
getting away.”41 Germans claimed that these democratic 
39 Jarausch, After Hitler, 31.
40 Fisher, Disciplining Germany, 72.  
41 Steven P. Remy, The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and 
Denazification of a German University (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 151.
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policies carried out by the occupiers were ignorant of the 
realities of postwar life in Germany.  In response to interview 
questions, Erich Neumeier stated that he believed the Marshall 
Plan, an American initiative that aided to help rebuild postwar 
Western Europe, had good intentions but was poorly organized 
and lacked understanding of the German people, customs, and 
beliefs. This was evidenced in the corn that was sent as a food 
ration to the starving German people—however, “in Germany 
corn is strictly food for picks [pigs]. So in Germany, Bavarian 
people thought the Americans think of us as [pigs].”42  Despite 
their need for such aid, the majority of German youth were 
attempting to retain their sense of nationalistic pride for their 
country, even in ruins, unwilling to lose their dignity in the face 
of such calamity. 
Although the former Nazi youth initially protested against 
democratization procedures, they also felt betrayed by Hitler 
and the Third Reich. While in the organization, Hitler Youth 
members became inspired by the German nationalist pride 
presented in their ritualistic activities and elaborate spectacles 
celebrating Nazism and Hitler’s leadership. Hitler became the 
archetype of National Socialism whom all the young boys and 
girls placed on a pedestal—as a father figure, he mattered more 
than Nazi ideology.43 Upon swearing their oath of fealty to the 
Führer in a ceremonial fashion, the members cast Hitler in a 
magical charismatic aura and thereby were inspired by his 
majesty; this is just one example of the effect of Nazi pageantry 
employed by the organization. Heck discusses an event where 
Hitler gave his speech to all the Hitler Youth members, who 
were overcome with emotion in hearing him speak; in that 
moment, Heck “belonged to Adolf Hitler body and soul.”44
Their admiration for Hitler and the Nazi ideal turned to shock 
when Germany collapsed and suffered through the postwar 
period. 
42 Neumeier, “Interview,” 4.
43 Tubach, German Voices, 43. 
44 Heck, Child of Hitler, 23.  
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Having been convinced of the invincibility of their Führer, 
Nazi Regime, and organization, Hitler Youth members ques-
tioned why Hitler’s Third Reich failed so miserably against the 
Allied powers. As the Nazi organization failed to protect them 
when they suffered from postwar depression, German youths 
began to portray themselves as victims rather than perpetrators 
of Nazi actions, hence Grass’ observation: “The crimes coming 
to light with peace, the flip side of war, were making victims 
out of perpetrators.”45 The victimization of the Hitler Youth 
kept them from admitting to themselves and others their 
complicity in furthering the Nazi cause against the Jews, raising 
the question of whether or not they were blameless. Although 
the Hitler Youth members often naively participated in their 
activities without fully understanding the actual indirect 
purposes—the effects of displaying power and superiority over 
younger members, for example—they were ultimately indoctri-
nated into having a sense of a strong nationalistic and racial 
superiority.  
In the postwar period, they were held accountable for their 
actions against the Jewish race, regardless of their indoctrina-
tion as youths. According to historian Tony Judt, postwar 
Germany had been democratized and “raised to see Nazism as 
responsible for war and defeat; but its truly awful aspects were 
consistently downplayed.”46 When the Adolf Eichmann trial 
occurred in 1960 in Jerusalem along with the Auschwitz trials 
later in Frankfurt, the German public became exposed to the 
evils of the Nazi regime. German youth radicals of the 1960s 
then began to claim that the Bonn Republic in West Germany 
actively sought to cover crimes formerly committed by Nazi 
youths and failed to allow Germans to confront their past—”as
a result, in the eyes of their sons and daughters they stood for 
nothing. Their material achievements were tainted by their 
45 Grass, Peeling the Onion, 240.  
46 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2005), 416.  
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moral inheritance.”47 These postwar protests represent the guilt 
former Nazi youths faced as a refusal of taking responsibility. 
Erich Neumeier admitted having “troubles being classified as a 
‘Nazi’ criminal,” mainly because he, like many other German 
youths, felt that “I was doing the same as the American GIs –
defending my country.”48 However, as Günter Grass explains in 
his memoir, “Guilt—whether proven, presumed, or con-
cealed—remains. . . .  It says its piece, fears no repetition, is 
mercifully forgotten for a time, and hibernates in our dreams.”49
The negative attitudes of the German youths impacted the 
reception towards democratization as a failure in the short term, 
making it initially difficult to undo the damage of Nazi indoc-
trination. Former Hitler Youth members who became Allied 
prisoners of war felt bitter resentment in losing to the Allies and 
were dehumanized through their experiences as Nazi fighting 
machines. For instance, Heck was captured by French military 
occupiers, who sent him to a penitentiary in Wittlich as a 
prisoner of war when they found out he was a Hitler Youth 
leader (Bannführer). He went through a process of reeducation, 
recalling a time when he viewed documentary films of death 
camps with indifference: 
The mountains of emaciated corpses had the opposite 
effect from what our conquerors intended. We thought 
they were fakes, posed to indict all Germans. The 
French became so incensed by our indifference that they 
rammed us with rifle butts. It was some time before I 
could accept the truth of the Holocaust, nearly three 
decades more before I could write or speak about 
German guilt and responsibility.50
In a similar way, Günter Grass faced the challenges as a POW 
when there were rumors that prisoners would be transferred to 
47 Ibid., 417.
48 Neumeier, “Interview,” 4.
49 Grass, Peeling the Onion, 28.  
50 Heck, Child of Hitler, 204-205.
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the Soviet zone—great fear struck the hearts of many prisoners. 
Grass also mentioned “rumors of a mass release of prisoners, 
occasionally combined with talk of shipping the youngest 
inmates off for reeducation: to America! They’ll knock the 
Hitler Youth out of you, the older soldiers jeered.”51 The harsh 
scare tactics that the Allies instigated began to influence the 
POWs, who were radically changed through the reeducation 
process—”completely unprepared for a West Germany in the 
throes of rapid economic growth and expansion, POWs 
appeared as sage observers from another age.”52
The German youths encountered in their postwar lives a 
stage of reexamination of their values, focusing mainly on their 
present survival rather than speaking out on their atrocities as 
Nazi youths. Having been let down by the fall of the Third 
Reich and rejection by the Allies as Nazi criminals, the youths 
distrusted their older authorities. As the Nazi foundations that 
they wholeheartedly followed became destroyed, the youths 
were unsure of where to place their faith; they therefore 
frequently withdrew from the community and maintained a
focus only within themselves.53 These youths displayed a 
disinterest towards government matters, taking no sides in party 
politics regarding democracy, Nazism, or otherwise — “by
all accounts most Germans were intent on one thing, das 
Überleben, or mere survival, and Allied armies were grappling 
to impose a victor’s order on the wartime chaos.”54 However, 
their social adaptation in a postwar Germany that was slowly 
becoming renewed as a nationalist state influenced the evolu-
tion of their ideals over time. Algot Joensson, who became a 
national director of an affiliate of the Swedish Trade Union 
Federation in 1941, provided his perspective on democracy 
51 Grass, Peeling the Onion, 188.  
52 Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable 
Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001), 90.
53 Kater, Hitler Youth, 257. 
54 Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany, 1.
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when compiling an observational report of the Bavarian areas 
struck by postwar devastation.  He urgently called for the 
creation of democracy to rebuild Germany, an initiative that 
would be led by its youth, and argued for trade unions to 
become the “core of democracy.”55 His argument sought to 
train youth to become progressive contributors in rebuilding the 
German society and aiding in its democratic development: this 
call was made “in order to be able to reach a judgment on a 
problem, [the German youth] will demand facts and, eventual-
ly, they will learn respect for facts, for the view of other people 
and for people themselves—a respect which is quite necessary 
in a democracy.”56
German youths in the western zones were also influenced 
by democratic youth organizations, which were headed by the 
Education and Religious Affairs Branch with foreign military 
officials guiding their activities.57 According to the U.S. 
military’s program guidelines, the democratization process in 
these organizations would be “achieved by acquainting the 
young people with such activities and interests as woodcrafts 
and athletics that were normal to youths of similar age in the 
United States.”58 One German youth, Manfred Fischer, who 
was chosen to participate in this re-indoctrination process, 
loved this experience, in which “good food, fireside meetings, 
talks about America, and simple interactions with the American 
soldiers in charge of the youth camp filled the days.”59 These 
55 Algot Joensson, Organized Labor and Democracy in Ger-
many, Office of the Military Government for Germany (U.S.), 
Manpower Division, Visiting Expert Series No. 15, October 1949,
University of Wisconsin, The History Collection Database, 9. 
56 Ibid., 14.
57 The U.S. Armed Forces German Youth Activities Program,
Historical Division Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 
1956, University of Wisconsin The History Collection Database, 2. 
58 Ibid., 5. 
59 Tubach, German Voices, 153. Upon the arrival of American 
soldiers occupying German territory, Fischer had lived with 
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organizations represented a quasi-Hitlerjugend that encouraged 
the spread of democracy rather than the Nazi cause. Most 
importantly, they helped to guide former Hitler Youths to 
eventually find their way toward democracy in a newly 
developed Germany and, thus, to move Germany toward the 
healing of its psyche. 
Legacy of Democratization in Postwar Germany
One major effect stemming from the democratization pro-
cess was the fracturing of unity between East and West Germa-
ny. Differences occurred in democratization procedures of the 
Eastern zone of Russia and the Western zones of America, 
Britain, and France that almost hindered the growth of a new 
German nationalism. According to German intellectuals, 
Germany suffered from “post-fascist democratic deficit” in 
which they sought to create stronger democratic institutions that 
pushed against totalitarianism, but struggled to identify with 
them.60 With American influences, West Germany actively 
pursued an effective democracy, modeled differently from the 
pre-Nazi Weimar Republic, to combat against Nazism; this 
zone became increasingly westernized.  Conversely, Russia’s 
ruthless denazification process created in the East German zone 
“a seemingly ‘more German Germany’ steeped in authoritarian-
ism.”61 For instance, the Free German Youth (FDJ) was 
established as a youth organization similar to those in the 
Western zones but with communist purposes. While the 
organization sought to convert its young members by including 
“fun into their activities, using some of the same techniques as 
the Hitler Youth,” its main focus was to develop the political 
American GIs, who used his home for U.S. Army Headquarters; 
he created a bond and admiration for these Americans despite their 
takeover. 
60 Müller, Another Country, 9. 
61 Ibid.
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education system based on socialism.62 This cruel re-
indoctrination and aggression of Communists on Eastern 
Germany is reflected in the tales of German refugees who 
managed to escape from the Eastern zone during the postwar 
period—”forcefully separated from their homes and posses-
sions, they desperately needed immediate assistance to com-
pensate them for their losses and integrate them into West 
German society.”63 As Erich Neumeier expressed, even as a 
member of the Hitler Youth he did not have much concern for 
politics or perceptions of the Jews before the postwar period. 
But following the war, his perceptions and concerns were 
confused and illustrated the mindset of many Germans: 
I was not interested in politics. That the stores of Jews 
were marked as “Ich Bin Ein Jude” was a fact of daily 
life and really not much concern to me. After the war, 
after the Koncentration camp stories became public, I 
became uncomfortable. But I ask myself what happened 
to the German prisoners of war in Russia? Even up to 
date only 20-25% were returned. The rest disappeared 
forever . . . and Russia was an alliance of the West!64
The statistics that Neumeier mentioned foreshadow the fact that 
in the wake of World War II, the Soviet Union was creating a 
Communist, totalitarian government in its occupied zone of 
Eastern Germany rather than aiding in democratization. Thus, 
the differences between East and West German political 
ideologies served to further divide Germany and confuse its 
citizens who were often already lost: in denial, emotionally 
distraught, and “uncomfortable” with what had transpired under 
Hitler’s Regime.  
62 Catherine Plum, Antifascism After Hitler: East German 
Youth and Socialist Memory, 1949-1989 (New York: Taylor and 
Francis Group, Routledge, 2015), 46.  
63 Moeller, War Stories, 22.
64 Neumeier, “Interview,” 2-3.
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Despite the deep political divisions within East and West 
Germany, the overall process of democratization throughout 
Germany effectively helped restore over time a new German 
nation that had formerly been ravaged by postwar crisis. 
American foreign occupiers established their influence and new 
organizations, such as the Social Democratic Party led by 
politicians like Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who sought to 
improve the nation’s postwar government. As a result, Germa-
ny eventually transformed into a developed and, once again 
advanced, nation. Erich Neumeier had moved away from 
Germany in 1954, due to the slow recovery of the national 
economy. He established his home in the United States, where 
prosperity and “easy money” kept him from returning to 
Germany. However, after fifteen to twenty years, he arrived in 
Germany again, only to find its massive transformation. Erich 
and his wife “felt we did not belong the[re] anymore. Only my 
brot[h]ers family was importend [important]. Most of our 
friends had moved and were not in Ingolstadt anymore.”65 With 
the transformation of the West German nation came the 
transformation of its youth, who eventually understood and 
accepted the evils of Nazism and began to work through their 
guilt and embarrassment.  The processes of denazification and 
democratization were necessary for Germans to come to terms 
with their past, helping them become a stronger nation in facing 
the consequences for their actions—in doing so, “acknowl-
edgement of their losses unified West Germans; it became 
central to defining the Federal Republic as a nation of vic-
tims.”66 In eventually accepting their responsibility for Nazi 
atrocities, many former Hitler Youths were able to record 
accounts of their perspectives towards Nazism and democracy, 
as the past was no longer painful. Their responses helped 
Germany move one step closer towards successful democratiza-
tion in the long term.  
65 Neumeier, “Interview,” 4-5. 
66 Moeller, War Stories, 22.
Furman Humanities Review
56
Conclusion
While the initial development of democratization was an 
ineffective failure in the short term, it gradually gained success,
as the new West German nation evolved economically and 
politically due to the efforts of groups like labor unions and 
former Hitler Youth who had come to terms, as best as they 
could, with what had occurred during the war. 
These former Hitler Youth members began to heal and 
work toward uniting the new German youth in their efforts to 
democratize Germany. The Hitler Youth’s indoctrination into 
National Socialism effectively trained its members as soldiers 
for the Third Reich. Yet according to former members Alfons 
Heck and Luftwaffe pilot Erich Neumeier, the organization’s 
appeal for them lay in athletics and social fellowship, which 
used the naiveté of its members to carry out the Nazi cause.  
After World War II and Nazi atrocities wreaked havoc on 
Europe and the Nazi state collapsed, former Hitler Youth 
members struggled to return to normalcy, initially rejecting 
Allied efforts of democratization in the process. Nevertheless, 
decades of demilitarization, denazification, reconstruction, and 
democratization, whether through other youth organizations or 
experiences in POW camps, helped fully convince Germany’s 
youth of the positive values of democracy. By accepting and 
taking responsibility for their actions, the former Hitler Youth 
helped Germany emerge out of the economic and political 
wreckage of World War II to become a new democratic nation. 
Hitler successfully indoctrinated the German youth and 
believed he would through them secure Germany’s future in 
National Socialism; however, as postwar Germany rose from its 
devastation, so too did its people as they learned to remember, 
rather than forget their past—”Memory likes to play hide-and-
seek, to crawl away. . . .   When pestered with questions, 
memory is like an onion that wishes to be peeled so we can 
read what is laid bare letter by letter.”67 Nevertheless, the youth 
67 Grass, Peeling the Onion, 3. 
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of Germany, which formerly symbolized the Nazi cause, 
became the true hope for Germany in its democratization and 
its steps toward healing the German spirit. 
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SEX EDUCATION, RAPE CULTURE, AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT:
THE VICIOUS CYCLE
Anna Lanford
One in five women will be sexually assaulted during her 
lifetime.1 Most of these cases do not occur when a stranger 
jumps out of the bushes, but with someone familiar to the 
victim. In fact, statistics show that sexual assault by an ac-
quaintance is even more common on college campuses. As 
stated in Furman University’s Sexual Misconduct Policies, 
“Over 90% of campus rapes are committed by friends, ac-
quaintances, or friends of friends.”2 In order to combat the high 
rate of sexual assault, both men and women need to have better 
understanding of what consent means and that it can be 
withdrawn at any time. In the legal context, there are various 
state laws and university policies that define consent and sexual 
assault. In the philosophical context, scholars such as Lois 
Pineau discuss the idea of communicative sexuality, which 
could transform the way we perceive both the victims and 
perpetrators of sexual assault. In this essay I will argue that the 
existing legal methods of determining consent are largely 
unhelpful as we can see from the overwhelming numbers of 
sexual assaults, especially on college campuses, and that 
1 National Sexual Violence Resource Center, “Statistics about 
Sexual Violence,” <http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publi
cations_nsvrc_factsheet_media-packet_statistics-about-sexual-
violence_0.pdf.>.
2 Furman University, Title IX: Gender Discrimination, Sexual 
Harassment & Sexual Misconduct (Greenville, SC, August 2015), 
7.
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communicative sexuality should be adopted as the standard for 
determining whether an encounter was consensual. I believe 
that the way to begin implementing communicative sexuality 
would start with more open discussions with young people 
about how to lead healthy sex lives instead of the limited sex 
education they receive today.
I will start by addressing current laws surrounding rape 
and consent. By examining these issues we can better under-
stand how to fix the problems that exist. Legislation regarding 
sexual assault offers little protection from abuse involving a 
friend or significant other, which constitute the majority of rape 
cases. In rape law there exists the idea of generalized consent in 
which “consent to prior sexual intercourse either indicates 
consent to subsequent intercourse or suggests a greater likeli-
hood that the defendant reasonably believed the victim consent-
ed to the later encounter.”3 In fact, until recently there were 
many states, such as Delaware and Hawaii, that in certain cases 
provided a rape shield exception that “allow[ed] for the 
admission of evidence of prior sexual conduct between the 
defendant and the victim . . . the more sexual history between 
two parties, the more evidence admitted under the rape shield 
exception, thereby increasing the likelihood that an inference of 
consent [would] be made.”4 In other words, the evidence of a 
sexual history could be used against a victim. This negates the 
right to say no at any point in a relationship, harkening back to 
the days when a concept such as marital rape did not exist –
when “‘I do’ translated into a blanket, irrevocable consent.”5
Laws like this strip all meaning from the idea that “no means 
no” and reinforce female subordination to any male figure, 
whether it be her husband, boyfriend, or just an acquaintance.
3 Nicholas Rahko (ed.), “Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of 
Consent: No Means No But What Does Yes Mean?” Harvard Law 
Review 117, no. 7 (May 2004): 2342.
4 Ibid., 2343.
5 Ibid., 2342.
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In addition to the lack of legal protection from assault by 
an acquaintance, women face blame for their sexual assault 
when they consented to other sexual acts but not the intercourse 
itself. Cases where consent was given to acts preceding a rape 
“could be viewed as the victim’s assumption of the risk that her 
limited consent will be misinterpreted as full consent.”6 In the 
majority of cases there is no witness, and it becomes one 
person’s word against another’s. At this point the court must 
address two questions: when did either party demonstrate intent 
to have sex and what actions or words were used to create the 
reasonable belief that consent had been given?7 However, it 
may be possible for consent to sexual intercourse to be retracted 
once given, which further complicates these questions. Courts 
in Maryland, North Carolina, and California have discussed the 
idea of postpenetration withdrawal of consent and have all 
rejected it as a possibility. But there are indeed certain instances 
when a woman could consent to sex only on certain conditions, 
such as using a condom, that if ignored, might be considered 
sex via deception and therefore rape. In this case, there are 
some states that argue that postpenetration rape could be a 
separate category from forcible rape, in the same way as rape 
by use of fraud or drugs are differentiated. But most of the laws 
currently in place leave the victim to prove that she was raped 
instead of requiring the accused to show the existence of 
ongoing consent.
To be able to fix these unjust laws, we must also under-
stand how consent is legally defined. States such as Wisconsin, 
Illinois, Minnesota, Washington, and New Jersey define 
consent as “words or overt actions by a person who is compe-
tent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agree-
ment to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”8 Colorado’s 
law states that consent is “cooperation in act or attitude pursu-
ant to an exercise of free will and with knowledge of the nature 
6 Ibid., 2348.
7 Ibid., 2352.
8 Ibid., 2351.
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of the act.”9 In California, consent is defined as “positive 
cooperation [or] a continual agreement throughout the sexual 
encounter.”10 Instead of resistance being required to prove 
instances of rape, California makes a step in the right direction 
when it promotes consent as continuous cooperation, which 
does not rely on the revocation of consent for a sexual experi-
ence to be considered assault. 
But state laws are not the only institutions that provide def-
initions of consent. Because of the high instances of sexual 
assault on college campuses, universities also promote their 
own definitions of consent. In looking at one example, Furman 
University defines consent as “informed, freely and actively 
given, and mutually understandable words or actions that 
indicate a willingness to participate in a mutually agreed-upon 
sexual activity.”11 It even goes as far as to say:
Consent cannot be inferred from:
1. Silence, passivity, or lack of resistance alone;
2. A current or previous dating or sexual relationship 
alone (or the existence of such a relationship with 
anyone else);
3. Attire;
4. The buying of dinner or the spending of money on a 
date;
5. Consent previously given (i.e., consenting to one 
sexual act does not imply consent to another sexu-
al act); or
6. Accepting an invitation to one’s apartment/room.12
This addresses many of the issues with general rape laws and 
concerns about determining consent. The university’s policies 
warn, “Consent may be withdrawn at any time,” which further 
supports a person’s right to change her or his mind during a 
9 Ibid., 2350.
10 Ibid.
11 Furman University, Title IX, 8.
12 Ibid.
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sexual encounter.13 However, even the best definitions of 
consent, as seen with Furman’s example, fail to protect against 
assault as they are put in practice within the context of rape 
culture – i.e. attitudes that promote the prevalence of victim 
blaming, the normalization of male sexual violence, and the 
generally sexist attitudes that contribute to the pervasiveness of 
sexual assault within our society.14 Therefore, I will continue 
by analyzing rape culture and how it manifests itself in daily 
interactions between men and women.
Simply defining consent does not stop sexual assault from 
occurring on this campus or similar campuses across America. 
Instead, the existence of rape culture throughout our society 
prevents these guidelines from being effective at preventing 
sexual assault. Because of this, I will now explain the need for a 
change in how our society perceives gender in regard to 
sexuality, which would put an end to rape culture. As pointed 
out by Lois Pineau in her essay “Date Rape: A Feminist 
Analysis,” we assume that the “normal components of romance 
include ‘male aggression’ and ‘female reluctance.’”15 These 
types of damaging preconceptions can also be seen in the belief 
that the victim in some way “asked for it” because of her attire, 
flirtatious behavior, or willingness to participate in certain 
sexual activities with her attacker. Women are taught that a 
man’s sexual needs are uncontrollable and that acting or 
dressing provocatively “generates some sort of contractual 
obligation” to fulfill this need.16 A provocative woman may 
indeed agree to participate in some sexual activity, but she has 
little protection from the court if she were to be assaulted. 
Oftentimes, this is termed victim-precipitated rape where “the 
13 Ibid.
14 “Rape Culture.” Marshall University. <www.marshall.edu/
wcenter/sexual-assault/rape-culture/>.
15 Lois Pineau, “Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis,” in The Phi-
losophy of Sex, ed. Nicholas Power et al., 6th ed. (Plymouth: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 462.
16 Ibid., 470.
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woman actually or apparently agreed to intercourse but retract-
ed before the actual act or did not react strongly enough when 
the suggestion was made by the offender(s).”17 Lack of consent 
alone would not be sufficient evidence to prove that a rape had 
occurred. In many instances, there would need to be overt 
resistance – for example, evidence of kicking, scratching, or 
hitting – that would prove to a jury that the sex was unwanted. 
In addition to finding their way into the courtroom and affect-
ing how the legal system deals with rape, these dangerous 
misconceptions perpetuated by rape culture about both male 
and female sexuality are harmful to the ways in which women 
can express their sexuality.
One such side effect of the persistence of rape culture is 
“the common belief that many women say no to sex, even when 
they mean yes, and that their protests are not to be taken 
seriously.”18 In fact, there exists the idea that rape gives women 
“the sexual enjoyment they really want, at the same time that it 
relieves them of the responsibility for admitting to acting upon 
what they want.”19 This sexist and unhealthy attitude has even 
affected the beliefs that women have about their own sexuality. 
Instead of being able to express themselves freely, many 
women feel the need to suppress their sexual desires in order to 
maintain a “pure” reputation. One study published in The 
Journal of Sex Research reveals that 37-39% of women have 
actually engaged in token resistance to sex, which is the “sexual 
intent to say no to sexual intercourse while meaning yes.”20 In 
these cases, women feel like it would somehow be better for 
them to deny their desires because they worry about appearing 
17 Rahko, “Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent,” 2347.
18 Susan Sprecher et al., “Token Resistance to Sexual Inter-
course and Consent to Unwanted Sexual Intercourse: College 
Students' Dating Experiences in Three Countries,” Journal of Sex 
Research 31, no. 2 (June 1994): 125.
19 Pineau, “Date Rape,” 469
20 Sprecher et al., “Token Resistance to Sexual Intercourse,”
125.
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promiscuous or they feel that withholding sex is the only way 
to have power in their relationship. Women who engage in this 
type of behavior are more likely to subscribe to the destructive 
patriarchal ideas that it is normal for men to use force to get 
what they want and that women are expected to find such 
forceful men attractive.21
The negative connotations surrounding overtly sexual 
women prevent them from being able to explore their sexuality 
and convince women that they should hide their sexual desires. 
At the same time, however, many women agree to unwanted 
sex because of “verbal pressure from their partner, need to 
conform to peer standards, and desire to maintain the relation-
ship.”22 Women should be able to turn down sexual advances 
and feel able to express their sexuality without fear of repercus-
sions. In fact, not being able to do these things may pose a 
threat to a woman’s psychology. In terms of agreeing to 
unwanted sex, Robin West demonstrates that women who 
engage in this behavior are more likely to damage their self-
assertion, self-possession, autonomy, and integrity. Even if they 
do not see these negative consequences immediately, these 
women can face serious damage to their psyche, for as West 
says, “The more thorough the harm . . . the greater the likeli-
hood that the woman involved will indeed not experience these 
harms as harmful, or as painful.”23 Although it may not be clear 
on the surface, the way that rape culture affects our society 
damages how women can express themselves sexually and the 
manner with which we address sex as a whole. 
Rape culture also promotes the normalization of sexual 
harassment, which is a further form of male power over 
women. According to the article “Sexual Harassment and the 
University” by Robert L. Holmes, sexual harassment is an 
21 Ibid., 126.
22 Ibid.
23 Robin West, “The Harms of Consensual Sex,” in The Phi-
losophy of Sex, ed. Nicholas Power et al., 6th ed. (Plymouth:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 389.
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expression of sexism that reinforces the power of men over 
women.24 In the case of universities, sexual harassment can be 
seen in both student-on-student and professor-on-student 
interactions. The sexual harassment of a student by a professor 
represents a violation of trust that prevents “the enrichment and 
empowerment of the learner to continue the process of intellec-
tual growth in the ways he or she personally deems best.”25
Student-on-student harassment is also an “invasion of privacy 
[that] jeopardizes the conditions under which learning can best 
take place.”26 To protect against this type of abuse, “a universi-
ty's concern should extend equally to all of its students” by 
providing council to all students involved in cases of sexual 
assault.27
In extending equal concern to all students in regards to 
sexual assault, some universities do not treat the accused and 
the accuser with the same respect. As Emily Bazelon points out 
in “The Return of the Sex Wars,” Harvard law professor Janet 
Halley discovered that certain university policies fail to handle 
cases of sexual assault properly when they fail to provide 
lawyers to students accused of misconduct who cannot afford 
them and choose to handle cases internally rather than giving 
them over to an impartial outside body.28 These kinds of 
policies are especially dangerous for students of color, who are 
more frequently discriminated against. Halley also realized 
while working with the LGBT community in the early 90s “that 
both men and women could use power and violence against 
each other.”29 Instead of pitting the sexes against each other, 
24 Robert L. Holmes, “Sexual Harassment and the University,”
An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical 
Inquiry 79, no. 4 (October 1, 1996): 6.
25 Ibid., 9.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 10.
28 Emily Bazelon, “The Return of the Sex Wars,” The New 
York Times, September 10, 2015, 2.
29 Ibid., 5.
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the way to reach complete equality is to open the lines of 
communication. If we can all discuss sexual harassment and 
abuse, how to avoid it, and how to prevent it from happening, 
entire communities would benefit. In fact, developing mutual 
respect and trust within a university campus actually proves to 
be more “effective in ending sexual harassment than are threats 
and punishment.”30 Having an open dialogue is important for a 
community, but we must also improve communication within 
our sexual relationships if we are ever to become comfortable 
discussing the subject publicly.
As I have demonstrated, most legal definitions of consent 
do not provide adequate protection against assault because they 
are warped by the pervasiveness of rape culture and lack of 
open communication about sex. I will continue by presenting a 
better concept of consent, one that includes the communicative 
sexuality model. Honest discussions regarding sex and consent 
with any and all partners is required in order to reduce or 
possibly eradicate instances of abuse. The first step is altering 
our perceptions of what consent means. We need to accept that 
one instance of consent is not sufficient, but that every sexual 
interaction requires a “reading of whether [your partner] agreed 
throughout the encounter.”31 Lois Pineau calls this continuous 
checking in throughout a sexual experience communicative 
sexuality. Rather than simply being “concerned with achieving 
coitus,” those participating in communicative sexuality should 
be focused on the desires of their partner and the ongoing 
interpretation of their responses.32 There also exists a mutual 
responsibility to “promote the sexual ends of one’s partners”
and also to “know what those ends are [and] . . . how those ends 
are attained.”33 This requirement of communicative sexuality 
does not only improve sexual experiences for one and one’s 
partner, but also helps pinpoint cases of sexual assault. Instead 
30 Holmes, “Sexual Harassment and the University,” 10-11.
31 Pineau, “Date Rape,” 471.
32 Ibid., 474, 475.
33 Ibid., 473-474.
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of relying on a victim to prove that he or she “resisted to the 
upmost,” the communicative sexuality model puts the burden of 
proof on the accused to prove the existence of ongoing con-
sent.34 This way of approaching sexual relationships helps 
women in a few ways that the current approach lacks, as it does 
not put any emphasis on whether she “was sexually provoca-
tive, her reputation, [or] what went on before the sex began. All 
that matters is the quality of communication with regard to the 
sex itself.”35
But how do we begin using this method of communica-
tion? In her essay “Mutual Respect and Sexual Morality: How 
to Have College Sex Well,” Yolanda Estes discusses how to go 
about implementing communicative sexuality in a college 
community. Like philosopher Thomas Mappes, who argues that 
voluntary and informed consent is necessary for any sexual 
encounter to be permissible, Estes asserts, “We become familiar 
with our common human dignity by engaging in interactions 
with others. . . . Manipulating (with lies or other deceptions) or 
coercing (with physical or psychological force) another person 
to perform an action she would not otherwise perform could not 
promote mutual respect.”36 Similar to Pineau, Estes champions 
the idea of reciprocal consent in which each participant in a 
sexual activity demonstrates clearly that they are freely choos-
ing to engage in that particular sexual activity at that particular 
moment.37 The first step is to start discussing our likes and 
dislikes with our partner before we engage in sexual activity, 
which decreases the possibility of miscommunication in the 
bedroom. Estes believes that by doing this we have a much 
greater chance of understanding our partner’s expressions of 
34 Ibid., 477.
35 Ibid., 479.
36 Yolanda Estes, “Mutual Respect and Sexual Morality: How 
to Have College Sex Well,” in College Sex: Philosophy for 
Everyone, ed. Michael Bruce and Robert M. Stewart (West 
Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), 210.
37 Ibid., 212.
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consent and desire. By reading our partner’s reactions, we in 
turn have a better chance for sexual fulfillment, “while also 
improving our sexual technique and our opportunity for a 
repeat performance.”38
Even though this may be a difficult task when pursuing a 
much more casual relationship, Estes believes that it is not 
completely impossible to practice communicative sexuality 
while hooking up with your Tinder date. Instead, she argues, 
“There’s nothing intrinsically morally wrong with casual sexual 
interactions, but the participants must be morally responsible 
and honest enough to communicate openly and respond 
considerately.”39 As long as we are open and respectful with all 
of our sexual partners, no matter how brief our connection, 
there is the possibility of responsible, pleasurable, consensual 
sex. To emphasize just how important communication with 
your partner is, Estes ends her essay by stating:
If you aren't man or woman enough to communicate 
about sex and to exert yourself with consenting and 
eager partners, then you aren't man or woman enough to 
get laid. If you aren't prepared to be a morally conscien-
tious sexual partner, start a vigorous exercise regimen, 
become a masturbatory virtuoso, or donate your time to 
a good charity, but don't muck up something as im-
portant as another person's sexual experience.40
From exploring the opinions of Pineau and Estes, it is clear that 
communicative sexuality is the best method for ensuring our 
partner’s (and our own) comfort during every sexual encounter. 
Seeing as adopting communicative sexuality as the norm would 
provide a better sexual experience for both men and women, 
how do we then go about promoting this idea so that it becomes 
more widely accepted? I believe that an important component 
to achieving this would be to improve the quality of sex 
38 Ibid., 213-214.
39 Ibid., 217.
40 Ibid., 219.
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education for young people and begin having discussions about 
what a healthy sex life means before people become sexually 
active. 
The next step in becoming more open about sexuality is to 
be comfortable talking to our children about how to build a 
healthy sexual relationship. Peggy Orenstein discussed this 
topic in her NPR interview titled “‘Girls & Sex’ and the 
Importance of Talking to Young Women about Pleasure.”
Nowadays, girls hear mixed messages about how to approach 
their sexuality – they must not be overtly sexual but at the same 
time should always be available for male pleasure. When 
Orenstein spoke with teenagers about this topic, one girl even 
said, “Usually the opposite of a negative is a positive, but when 
you're talking about girls and sex, the opposite of slut is prude, 
both of which are negative. So what are you supposed to do?”41
Through the difficulty that girls have with navigating between 
both of these damaging terms, Orenstein sees that they are 
taught to view sex as a way to please their partners but not 
themselves.42 And this problem starts with how we teach girls 
about their sexuality beginning at a young age. Parents of little 
girls tend not to even name their daughter’s genitals as they 
would with their son, as Orenstein realized, “For boys, they'll 
say, ‘Here's your nose, here's your shoulders, here's your waist, 
here's your pee pee,’ whatever. But with girls, there's this sort 
of blank space — it's right from navel to knees, and not naming
something makes it quite literally unspeakable.”43
This situation does not seem to improve as girls grow up, 
even within an educational setting. As young people begin 
puberty and move into middle and high school sex education 
classes, teachers address the changes that take place in the male 
and female bodies much differently. Girls are taught about their 
41 Peggy Orenstein, “'Girls & Sex' And The Importance Of 
Talking To Young Women About Pleasure,” Fresh Air Interview 
(National Public Radio, March 29, 2016).
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
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internal anatomy with charts and diagrams, about periods and 
unwanted pregnancies. Boys are taught about erections and the 
“emergence of a near-unstoppable sex drive.”44 Orenstein sees 
an issue with this, posing the question, “When do we address 
exploration, self-knowledge?”45 There is no discussion about 
what a healthy sex life is or how to communicate sexual desires 
with your partner. Many times the only instruction on safe sex 
is to abstain from sexual activities all together. This lack of 
education doesn’t mean that young people still aren’t curious 
about their bodies. Oftentimes, young girls and boys will turn to 
pornography to further understand how sexual relationships are 
supposed to work when they don’t get enough information from 
their teachers or parents. In Orenstein’s New York Times article 
“When Did Porn Become Sex Ed?” she says, “According to a 
survey of college students in Britain, 60 percent consult 
pornography, at least in part, as though it were an instruction 
manual, even though nearly three-quarters say that they know it 
is as realistic as pro wrestling.”46 Young adults who have no 
real sex education, many armed with abstinence-only teachings 
and the instruction of pornography, go to college with no idea 
how real sexual relationships are supposed to work and attempt 
to navigate their newfound sexual freedom. The lack of a good 
sex education, one that includes discussion of communicative 
sexuality, leaves rape culture assumptions unchallenged and 
perpetuates the negative stereotypes of male and female 
sexuality. 
Because this lack of sex education is so widespread, espe-
cially in America, most college-aged people do not understand 
the nuances of discussing desire, pleasure, and consent with 
their partner as required in the communicative sexuality model. 
This tends to lead to dangerous consequences when hookups on 
college campuses often involve dangerous amounts of alcohol. 
44 Peggy Orenstein, “When Did Porn Become Sex Ed?” The 
New York Times, March 19, 2016. 
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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Although I have determined that it is possible to have casual 
sex in combination with a communicative sexuality, the heavy 
use of alcohol decreases our ability to be good communicators. 
At colleges across the country, alcohol has become the “No. 1 
date drug,” as hookups have become increasingly dependent on 
the social lubricant.47 Explanations of the dangers of alcohol 
are often heavily gendered, which creates further problems. On 
the one hand, girls are warned to never leave their drinks 
unattended because someone might slip something into their 
drink. On the other hand, boys are pressured to drink more to 
appear more masculine, oftentimes without being aware of the 
possible repercussions. In most instances, alcohol “reduces a 
person's ability to read social cues” and reduces inhibitions, 
which gives boys the courage to commit assaults they might 
otherwise not commit and makes them more aggressive in 
general.48 In addition, alcohol makes boys (and girls) less likely 
to intervene as bystanders when they see such aggressive 
behaviors. The lack of knowledge about sex in combination 
with a lack of understanding about alcohol contributes to the 
existence of a non-communicative sexuality that frequently 
leads to instances of sexual assault. These issues relating to 
college sex show us that we need to be more open as a society 
about talking about sex. If we were open about sex earlier, then 
it is more likely that, as a whole, we would practice safer sex. It 
is a proven fact that the earlier parents, teachers, and doctors 
start talking to kids about sex “the more likely they are both to 
delay sexual activity and to behave responsibly and ethically 
when they do engage in it.”49 This is what we need if we are 
going to expect teenagers or even adults to engage in healthy 
sexual relationships.
The legal, moral, and philosophical issues stemming from 
sexual assault and consent have deep roots in our societal 
perceptions about women and sex. Over the course of this 
47 Orenstein, “Girls & Sex.”
48 Ibid.
49 Orenstein, “When Did Porn Become Sex Ed?”
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essay, I have argued that the current legal definitions of consent 
do not protect against instances of assault because of the 
existence of rape culture, which damages female sexuality, 
promotes sexual harassment, and allows for the high rates of 
sexual assault that occur each year. The way to fix these issues 
would be to adopt the communicative sexuality model. I believe 
that if we stopped being afraid to have open and honest 
discussions with young people about the benefits of communi-
cative sexuality and pleasure instead of constantly focusing on 
the potential negative consequences, men and women could 
have healthier sex lives. If we taught boys and girls the same 
things about pleasure and consent, everyone would respect the 
right to say no to sex just as much as the right to say yes. If we 
started these conversations at an early age, to practice commu-
nicative sexuality as an adult would become natural. If this 
were to become the norm, I believe that cases of sexual assault 
would decrease, and instances where it did occur would be 
more easily prosecuted and properly punished. Without the 
harmful effects of a rape culture that assumes that a victim 
“asked for it,” cases of sexual assault would be based on the 
idea of ensuring ongoing consent instead of what she was 
wearing or how much she resisted. In order to change how the 
law handles sexual assault, we need to change how our culture 
views sex. In order to change how our culture views sex, we 
need to educate young people about the benefits, not just the 
risks, of sexual activity.
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ANNE CARSON: SHAPING THE SELF AND 
SHIFTING UNDER THE READER’S GAZE
Margaret Shelton
Two bodies outlined on a bed, the eye (“I”) of one rising 
up and feeling the distance between conscious choice and 
compulsion of the soul. Two desks, one placed at each extremi-
ty of the writerly self as its owner fights to define and to escape 
definition. Thirteen still images of the self in stop-motion, and 
one subject shifting in thirteen frames. Covering such topics as 
loss of love and search for self, “The Glass Essay” floats 
between essay and poem, borrowing from each genre, liminal 
like the space in which poet, scholar, and literary critic Anne 
Carson seats the self, edges alternately blurring and sharp like a 
shard of glass. In this piece and in interviews, Carson works to 
move toward a self that she can understand and accept—one 
that she can define. Yet Carson’s drive to create a shared 
meaning battles with her joy in being the only one to know all 
of the secret selves within her. Carson in literature and in life 
prizes both crisp lines and elusiveness, which shows in the 
contrast between her precise language and shadowed meanings, 
loving the liminal, craving connection as well as the ability to 
craft a self purely her own.
Writer and literary critic Vivian Gornick in The Situation 
and the Story addresses the presence and necessity of the self in 
writing, emphasizing the importance of the stability of the self. 
According to Gornick, “the way the narrator—or persona—” or 
self “sees things is, to the largest degree, the thing being seen,”
especially in non-fiction writing.1 Gornick explains that “[t]he 
1 Vivian Gornick, The Situation and the Story: The Art of Per-
sonal Narrative (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 7.
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situation is the context or circumstance, sometimes the plot; the 
story is the emotional experience that preoccupies the writer: 
the insight, the wisdom, the thing one has come to say,” but to 
take her claim one step further, to consider what preoccupies 
the reader, it is the discovery of self, both the author’s self and 
the reader’s, that motivates the reading.2 The situation is the 
background, the story is the fuel for the writer, but as a reader, I 
come to non-fiction for connection, a sense that in writing her 
story the author has woven into it something of mine, some-
thing of me. The setting and the action are essential but 
essentially disparate things; the self strings the reader along and 
makes the narrative cohesive.
The creation of a self fascinates Gornick, especially when 
she thinks in terms of persona, which allows the writer to draw 
her own lines around the sections of self that she wants to 
present. Gornick’s ideal persona can be defined by, or rather is, 
one attribute. She explains after rereading a diary that she had 
written earlier:
With relief I thought, I’m not losing myself. Suddenly I 
realized there was no myself to lose. I had a narrator on 
the page strong enough to do battle for me. The narrator 
was the me who could not leave her mother because she 
had become her mother. She was not intimidated by 
“alone again.” Nor, come to think of it, was she much 
influenced by the me who was a walker in the city, or a 
divorced middle-aged feminist, or a financially insecure 
writer. She was apparently, only her solid, limited self—
and she was in control.3
The beauty of this self for Gornick is that it allows her to isolate 
one element of her personality, of her life, and to communicate 
that alone to the reader. The ability to section off the self allows 
the author to ensure that the reader sees the written self from a 
certain angle because the persona like Gornick’s only presents 
2 Ibid., 13.
3 Ibid., 22-23.
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one angle. In contrast, Anne Carson sees the multiplicities 
inside herself and connects to the reader by shattering the self 
to see inside and offering the pieces for the reader to put back 
together to make something meaningful. 
While the self runs through the piece like a thread, string-
ing together seemingly disparate sections, the complexity of its 
weave keeps the self from ever being fully exposed or under-
stood. Rather than showing her self to the reader in neat even 
stitches, Carson brings the self to the top of the poetic pattern 
only to let it sink again into the background, giving the reader 
images of the speaker in the Nudes and letting the self speak 
through the words of others like Emily Brontë, but never quite 
saying, “Here I am.” Carson examines the self from several 
different angles in “The Glass Essay,” but the self that she 
illustrates is distanced, fluid, fleeing.
Carson’s ability to situate this fluid self within a clearly 
structured form is what makes “The Glass Essay” a complex 
study. The piece consists of nine distinct subtitled sections, 
each of which comprises several three- or four-lined stanzas. 
The sturdiness of this structure allows Carson to establish on 
the page a liminal self as well as a written piece seated in the 
liminal space where two genres touch—poetry and non-fiction. 
As critic Ian Rae points out in his article on Carson’s narrative 
technique in the poem, Carson has been criticized by some 
American critics as writing “‘chopped prose’ . . . positioning it 
as the exemplary case of a hybrid and increasingly prominent 
genre, the lyric essay.”4 Carson published “The Glass Essay” in 
her book of poetry Glass, Irony, and God, but she labels it 
“essay” from the start. Poetry allows for embellishment, but 
essay suggests reality. This straddling of genres prepares the 
reader for the vivid, often enigmatic imagery that the idea of 
poetry connotes, but it also looks forward to the detail- and 
fact-oriented prose through which Carson communicates.
4 Ian Rae, “Verglas: Narrative Technique In Anne Carson's 
‘The Glass Essay,’” English Studies In Canada 37, no. 3-4 (2011): 
164.
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Rae further explores the duality between the studied and 
the secret self that runs through Carson’s work, looking 
especially at the significance of her title, “The Glass Essay.” He 
writes that “Carson employs the logic of the lyric essay to 
produce an extended, bilingual pun on the multiple senses of 
the English ‘glass’ (transparent material, magnifying lens, 
mirror) and the French glace (ice, mirror).”5 Carson brings into 
play the idea of glass as a mirror in the first section of the poem 
when she writes, “My face in the bathroom mirror / has white 
streaks down it. / I rinse the face and return to bed. / Tomorrow 
I am going to visit my mother.”6 This scene gestures toward 
philosopher Jacques Lacan’s work on the Mirror Stage, which 
he describes as “an identification . . . namely, the transfor-
mation that takes place in the subject when he assumes [as-
sume] an image”—which, in this case, Carson creates of and for 
herself in the poem—and comes to view the individual pieces 
of the whole gestalt that is the self.7 This section holds the first 
indication of the division between Carson’s selves that reap-
pears throughout the piece in her choice to use a dissociative 
article, “the face,” instead of claiming “my face” a second time. 
It is when Carson looks into the mirror and confronts her own 
image that she starts to view herself from a distance.
Carson speaks about the process of placing these distinct 
images next to one another in an interview with Rae for the 
Paris Review, explaining that “particular images begin the 
thinking or the work. For example, ‘The Glass Essay’ began 
with staring at a frozen ditch near my mother’s house, which I 
think actually occurs in the poem somewhere. So some phe-
nomenological thing gives rise to the idea.”8 Rae asserts that 
the author’s continued reexaminations of the “phenomenologi-
5 Ibid.
6 Anne Carson, “The Glass Essay,” in Glass, Irony, and God
(New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation, 1995), 1.
7 Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2006), 76.
8 Rae, “Verglas,” 170.
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cal thing” stack up to form the poem and that “[the] evolving 
glass/glace motif thereby serves to cluster percepts, affects, and 
memories in a constant state of becoming.”9 The self acts in the 
same way in “The Glass Essay,” evolving and changing, 
fracturing further with each section. 
Carson narrates the splitting of the self, this “becoming”
during her final encounter with Law, her ex-lover in section 
four of the piece, titled “Whacher.” The speaker notes that Law 
will not meet her eyes when he tells her that there was “not 
enough spin on . . . our five years of love,” and she “[feels her] 
heart snap into two pieces / which floated apart.”10 This signals 
the initial break in Carson, the duality that she establishes 
throughout this section between body and mind, between “soul”
(love’s “necessities”) and “I” (conscious choice).11 After 
removing her clothes, the speaker describes herself not as naked 
but as “nude.”12 The term “nude” here echoes the Nudes, the 
metaphorical paintings in terms of which the speaker thinks of 
herself. As “nude” is a term used typically to describe art that 
Carson here uses in reference to the self, it furthers the point 
that the speaker feels that she is in ownership of her body, like 
an artist in technical terms owns a painting that she creates, but 
that her body is operating outside of her control like a painting 
that has meaning not necessarily in connection to the artist but 
in itself. When disconnected from the consciousness attached to 
it, the speaker’s body, like a painting, betrays her and deter-
mines its own meaning.
She becomes a consciousness living in a body that rebels 
against her, distinguishing between the two in a pronoun 
change, “I turned my back because he likes the back” (emphasis 
mine).13 She possesses the body but is distanced from it; owns 
it but does not control it. The body is drawn to “a man who no 
9 Ibid.
10 Carson, “The Glass Essay,” 11.
11 Ibid., 12.
12 Ibid., 11.
13 Ibid.
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longer cherished me” and runs through the empty motions of 
something that used to have meaning, but the “I,” the self, is 
only unwillingly dragged along:
There was no area of my mind 
not appalled by this action, no part of my body
that could have done otherwise.14
The speaker then complicates further the distinction between 
the body and the “I” attached to it when she writes:
But to talk of mind and body begs the question. 
Soul is the place,
stretched like a surface of millstone grit between body 
and mind,
where such necessity grinds itself out.
Soul is what I kept watch on all that night.15
Not only are “I” and body separating, but the speaker now tries 
to separate soul and self-awareness in the form of “I.” The 
thinking and rational “I” watches over “soul,” symbolic of love, 
in two senses—watching over as in caring for something and 
watching over as in guarding against something—seemingly 
both to preserve the love with Law that occurred in the soul and 
to protect the speaker from feeling it. When Law and the 
speaker grow closer, physically and emotionally, the speaker’s 
consciousness, the “I,” ejects itself from the body in what 
seems an attempt at defending and removing itself from the 
potentially destructive emotions of the situation. “I” floats 
“high up near the ceiling looking down / on the two souls 
clasped there on the bed / with their mortal boundaries [bodies] 
/ visible around them like lines on a map.”16 While the speaker 
stays through the souls’ division, “I” takes itself away.
Carson’s syntax and diction in this section reinforce this 
idea of a flight from emotion. When describing the develop-
14 Ibid., 12.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
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ment of the encounter with Law, Carson uses heavily descrip-
tive and figurative language, describing the night as “a night 
that centred Heaven and Hell,” “as if it weren’t really a night of 
sleep and time.”17 The religious language of Heaven and Hell 
gives the impression that the two of them—the speaker and 
Law—are in the middle of their own private apocalypse, a final 
coming together and a final falling away with their universes 
swirling around them. The night is suspended outside of time, 
spanning forever and an instant, but the speaker is also out of 
time in the sense that she feels her relationship with Law 
expiring, its final minutes ticking away. Yet after “I” rises up, 
rises away from body and soul, separating consciousness from 
carnal impulse, after Law and the speaker become just “two 
souls clasped there on the bed,” caged in by two bodies, 
Carson’s language becomes more factual and terse:
I saw the lines harden.
He left in the morning. 
It is very cold
walking into the long scraped April wind.
At this time of year there is no sunset
just some movements inside the light and then a sinking 
away.18
For the speaker, this final interaction with Law is like the 
sunset; it lacks closure. There is no finality to their relationship, 
just one shared night and the slow sink of two “I’s” back into 
body and soul, away from each other and into their separate 
selves. The lines that divide Law and the speaker harden.
In an interview with John D’Agata, Carson addresses this 
blurring and redrawing of lines: “I just remember writing in 
second grade every Friday afternoon. It was such a pleasure. 
We’d draw a picture then write on it and tell what it was.”19
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 John D’Agata and Anne Carson, “A ______ with Anne Car-
son,” The Iowa Review 27, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 1997): 9.
Furman Humanities Review
86
When D’Agata asks, “Why was that pleasurable?” Carson 
responds, “How could it not be pleasurable?”20 Even as a child 
in grade school, Carson enjoyed condensing entities into 
images into the written word, illustration, and description 
working both to share and to shroud. Carson shows her love of 
translating lines into letters in her final images of “The Glass 
Essay” and explores the division within the self in the sections 
of “The Glass Essay” entitled “Liberty” and “Thou” when she 
describes herself as a set of paintings—Nudes No. 1 through 
No. 13. The speaker explains that these Nudes came to her 
when she meditated in the mornings as “nude glimpse[s] of my 
lone soul,” the same self in thirteen iterations, from thirteen 
angles, shifting and fracturing like light through glass.21 She 
writes that the nudes are “as clear in my mind / as pieces of 
laundry that froze on the clothesline overnight.”22 Frozen 
suggests ice, which suggests fragility. Though these Nudes are 
the clothing in which the speaker dresses herself, the images are 
not enduring; they capture the self in one instant and are apt to 
shatter in the next, like ice, like glass.
These images act as crystals, freezing a moment of herself 
so that she can turn it around in her mind and use it as a lens 
through which to look out at her life. When the speaker tells her 
therapist about the Nudes, her therapist asks her, “When you 
see these horrible images why do you stay with them?  . . .  
Why not go away?” the speaker responds, “I was amazed. / Go 
away where? I said.”23 Her response suggests that to escape the 
Nudes, the variations of self that manifest to her, would be 
impossible. Not only do these Nudes contain something of her; 
they are contained in her. These nude portraits are on display in 
the gallery of her body: “Woman caught in a cage of thorns . . . 
unable to stand upright,” “woman with a single great thorn 
implanted in her forehead . . . endeavouring to wrench it out,”
20 Ibid.
21 Carson, “The Glass Essay,” 17.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 18.
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“woman on a blasted landscape / backlit in red like Hierony-
mous Bosch.”24 She is aware that they are not her but pictures 
of her. Yet to quote David Shields, quoting Orson Welles, 
quoting Elmyr de Hory, whose quote is so far removed from its 
author that it has taken on an existence independent of him, “If 
my forgeries are hung long enough in the museum, they 
become real.”25
Foucault muses over this disconnect between the object 
pictured and the picture-object itself in René Magritte’s 
painting “The Treachery of Images,” in which Magritte places 
the painted image of a pipe above the words, written in “a
steady, painstaking, artificial script,” “Ceci n’est pas une 
pipe”—this is not a pipe. Foucault also discusses a second 
iteration of the image, in which Magritte depicts the original 
painting “set within a frame” on an easel on a floor, above 
which floats “a pipe exactly like the one in the picture, but 
much larger.”26 Foucault muses over the piece, wondering if it 
is more accurate to say that there are “two pipes” or “two 
drawings of the same pipe.”27 The reader can ask the same 
question of Carson’s nudes. They are separate paintings; no two 
images are the same. Yet while none of the nudes are identical, 
they represent the same subject and attempt to convey the same 
idea in different scenes—the same self from different angles. 
Foucault explains that while the individual elements of the 
picture are identifiable as pipe, easel, floor, the piece lacks the 
cohesion necessary to convey a clear meaning. The larger, 
unframed pipe “lacks coordinates” and floats suspended in 
space, and the easel’s legs are uneven, foretelling collapse.28
Both artists paint their images with a specificity of detail that 
24 Ibid., 17.
25 David Shields, Reality Hunger: A Manifesto (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2011), 34.
26 Michel Foucault, This Is Not a Pipe, ed. James Harkness 
(Berkeley: University of California Press: 1983), 15.
27 Ibid., 16.
28 Ibid., 17.
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suggests that they know the secret meaning. Yet Carson, like 
Magritte, presents the viewers with the materials that make up 
the art but disguise the process, leaving the discovery of means 
and the creation of meaning to the reader.
Carson calls back to these artistic elements of “The Glass 
Essay” in a later interview for The Paris Review with fellow 
writer Will Aitken, elucidating her choice to incorporate the 
Nudes as a sort of mock-ekphrastic exercise, writing them as 
paintings and not simply incorporating them into the poem as 
frameless images:
[Aitken:] “There’s too much self in my writing.” Is the 
range of work that you do—poetry, essays, opera, aca-
demic work, teaching—is that a way of trying to punch 
windows in the walls of the self?
[Carson:] No. I would say it’s more like a way to avoid 
having a self by moving from one definition of it to 
another. To avoid being captured in one persona by 
doing a lot of different things.29
This quote suggests a possible reading that she approached each 
Nude as a potential angle for the self but intended that the 
combination would lack the coherence necessary to allow the 
self to be pinned down. Carson remarks at one point during the 
interview that one of her books “is like architecture because the 
poem, the original ancient poem which does exist, is in the 
center.”30 Similarly, the core of the speaker in “The Glass 
Essay,” that self, exists at the center of the poem; the reader can 
feel the words winding around her. Carson goes on to say 
though that there was “no adequate representation of it I could 
give, so I made up all these angles for it . . . so there are ways 
of moving into and out of a room from other rooms in the 
building, but really what I want to show is glimpses of that 
29 Will Aitken, “Anne Carson: The Art of Poetry No. 88,” The 
Paris Review 171 (Fall 2004).
30 Ibid.
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main room in the center.”31 Carson moves the reader through 
the house of herself, offering views through keyholes and 
cracks in the wall, but she never opens the door for the reader to 
see her self in its entirety. If this is the case, the essential 
quality of the self that Carson presents in the poem is its desire 
to understand itself but to remain undefined.
Carson elaborates on this struggle between self-
determination and disguise in her interview with D’Agata in a 
discussion of the two writing desks in her home. D’Agata 
explains that he understands Carson to have two separate 
writing desks, one for writing poetry and one for academic 
writing. Carson confirms the assertion. She then comments that 
after she wrote Eros the Bittersweet, which D’Agata described 
as both a critical examination of and a lyrical meditation on 
Sappho’s writings, “It was possibly the last time that I got those 
two impulses to move in the same stream—the academic and 
the other. After that, I think I realized I couldn’t do it again.”32
D’Agata then argues with Carson, trying to convince her that 
“some people would say you’re still doing it . . . [t]hat there’s 
no suggestion of two desks at work,” but Carson refuses to let 
herself be pinned down or outlined by others.33 The two desk 
method seems a way of splitting, not only her written self but 
her writing self, into the Carson who writes academically and 
the Carson who writes (and is) “other.” “No,” she says. “No?”
he asks. Silence.34 She knows the answer. She knows herself. 
She eludes.
Carson translates the desire for an elusive literary self into 
the self that inhabits her physical body through an expression of 
gender fluidity. According to gender theorist Judith Butler, 
“Gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted 
in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts” which 
31 Ibid.
32 D'Agata and Carson, “A ______ with Anne Carson,” 9.
33 Ibid., 10.
34 Ibid., 11.
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“constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self.”35 For 
Butler, gender is self-determined. It is “stylized,” something 
performed and constructed by each individual and not tied to 
the body that the individual inhabits. In the interview with 
Aitken, Carson’s speech parallels Butler’s idea of gender as 
performance and illusion, saying, “I guess I’ve never felt 
entirely female, but then probably lots of people don’t. But I 
think that at different times in my life I located myself in 
different places on the gender spectrum.”36 Her active voice 
attests to the elective aspect of Carson’s gender. She does not 
say, “I’ve found myself in different places,” or even “I’ve been 
in different places,” but “I have located myself in different 
places.”
Carson also varies the way in which she performs gender, 
just as she varies the literary genres in which she writes, 
conscious that while she works toward self-expression, she 
must also work against the literary and social constructs that 
would confine her to a certain definition of genre or gender. 
Speaking to her desire to live in a liminal gender space, or a 
space altogether un-gendered, Carson equates her experience to 
“a problem of extended adolescence: You don’t know how to 
be yourself as part of a category, so you just have to be yourself 
as a completely strange individual and fight off any attempt 
others make to define you.”37 Carson struggles to make what 
society would have marked as a phase in adolescence into a 
place in which she can fully inhabit herself; rather than assimi-
late society’s truth she can create her own.
Or she can let her own truth radiate out from within her. 
The last nude in her series of self-iterations, “Nude #13 arrived 
when I was not watching for it”—”a human body / trying to 
stand” against winds that tear away the flesh, “cleansing the 
35 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1999), 179.
36 D'Agata and Carson, “A ______ with Anne Carson,” 8.
37 Ibid., 9.
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bone,” “and there was no pain.”38 Speaker and I and the outside 
world write and whittle away at an idea of the self, and then 
Carson steps out from the midst of them. In the image of the 
13th Nude, Carson is the source of speaker; she is the “I” and 
the words and the wind “so terrible that the flesh was blowing 
away from the bone.”39 The craft and the chaos of Nudes and 
selves clings as dust to the heels of her feet, and then Carson is 
the pillar of bone, “[standing] forth silver and necessary.”40
Maintaining eye contact, she blows away the dust.
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A BETTER PASTURE:
EXCELLENT SHEEP, AMOUR-PROPRE,
AND THE SEARCH FOR HAPPINESS
Nathan Thompson
“It is a hundred times easier to be happy than to 
appear to be happy.”
-Jean Jacques Rousseau
“Of course I’m miserable, but were I not miserable, 
I wouldn’t be at Yale.”
-William Deresiewicz
A double major, a sport, a musical instrument, a couple of 
foreign languages, service work in distant corners of the globe, 
and, of course, a few hobbies thrown in for good measure, each 
mastered with effortlessness and a serene self-assurance. This is 
the stuff of 21st-century super-achievers, those students at elite 
schools who appear cheerfully competent at everything. If that 
sounds anything like you, your friends, or what you aspire to 
be, this paper is for you. If the names Deerfield, Williams, 
Harvard, or Stanford mean anything to you, this paper is for 
you. Most importantly, if you’re tired of running laps on the 
well-worn treadmill of success, this paper is for you.
In his Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American 
Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life, William Deresiewicz 
unapologetically exposes the aspirations and deep-rooted 
anxieties of the “best and brightest” filing into the top universi-
ties in the United States. He introduces the reader to the 
formidable combination of brains, ambition, and fear of failure 
residing in many young people and their families. These 
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students’ capacity to consume, analyze, and regurgitate 
information is breathtaking, be it every member of a class 
memorizing and reciting 100 lines of Shakespeare without a 
single error or a high school student conducting cancer re-
search. Assign them a school task, and it will be completed 
with ruthless efficiency. Every “i” will be dotted. Every “t” will 
be crossed. Curiously, however, closer examination reveals so 
many similarities between these high achievers that their 
individual identities appear stripped away. One might even go 
so far as to call them sheep. Of course, they are not average 
sheep—they roam around together, eating AP courses for 
breakfast, spending summers working prestigious internships, 
and traveling the world for cultural enrichment. They are 
excellent.
These kinds of students, however, are no longer simply the 
product of the meritocracy for which America is famed. They 
do not come from just anywhere, nor do they embody time-
honored American examples of how hard work, long hours, and 
a little bit of luck can take children of poverty and turn them 
into something exceptional. Quite the opposite. In the clear, 
compelling, and frightening three hundred pages of his Coming 
Apart: The State of White America 1960-2010, Charles Murray 
demonstrates that, for the first time, America is seeing both the 
drawing and hardening of class lines: a real upper class, a real 
lower class, and everyone in the middle moving in one direc-
tion or the other.1 However, this divergence is not only a 
monetary one. It is also one of values, habits, education, and 
geographic location—and make no mistake: while a few 
stragglers are welcomed into the fold, Deresiewicz’s sheep are 
the children of this new upper class.
These excellent sheep, populating the Ivies (or their neigh-
bors who rank highly in U.S. News and World Report) and 
prestigious financial and consulting institutions after gradua-
tion, are the product of several important inputs: top-flight 
1 Charles Murray, Coming Apart: The State of White America, 
1960-2010 (New York: Crown Forum, 2012), 23-126.
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education, high family income, stability at home, parents with 
advanced degrees, and geographic isolation from those not 
sharing similar characteristics. Together, these factors have 
begun limiting the capacity of traditional American meritocracy 
to generate social and economic mobility. These students are 
exceptionally competent, analytical, intelligent, and hard-
working, but it would be dishonest to say that their smarts are 
the sole cause of their material success in life. Success nowa-
days is primarily, if not exclusively, the result of a system. It is 
a system caught somewhere between being hereditary and 
meritocratic—generally speaking, circumstances of birth are 
important but may not be enough to succeed anymore without 
the brains to match and vice versa—and its products are 
peerless. It is a system Deresiewicz describes as the laundering 
of privilege.2
Despite this system’s effectiveness, the excellence it pro-
duces comes at costs much greater than a few missed parties 
and a handful of all-nighters. These costs are perhaps known 
and felt in the deepest corners of the heart and mind but go 
otherwise unarticulated: insecurity, fear of failure, a deep-
rooted unhappiness, and the atrophy of the soul. Recognizing 
such costs might reasonably lead one to challenge and look for
alternatives to an excellent sheep’s notion of success, and 
because these potential costs are too great to ignore, the 
remainder of the paper will attempt to give them proper 
attention.  
In order to understand these creatures of success, it is first 
necessary to explore the origin of their excellence. As 
Deresiewicz and others observe, one does not have to look long 
or far to see what creates this crop of high achievers. It begins 
in the home, where a suffocating amount of pressure is applied 
to achieve success from a young age. It does not even have to 
be intentional. But as Deresiewicz writes, the business of 
2 William Deresiewicz, Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of 
the American Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life (New York: 
Free Press, 2014), 211.
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“determining the exact hierarchy of status within the upper 
middle class itself” is a serious one, and most, if not all, of a 
family’s resources tend to be directed towards building the 
pressure cooker that will spit out diamonds bearing Ivy League 
credentials.3
The lesson is learned from an early age that in life “there is 
no middle ground; if you’re not the best, you’re a ‘loser.’ If 
you’re not brilliant, you’re worthless.”4 Students may find 
themselves identifying with the pressures that Deresiewicz 
claims converge at home: “status competition within extended 
families; peer pressure within communities; the desire to 
measure up to your own parents, or to best them.”5 The list of 
achievements attained by kids trying to relieve those pressures 
include the usual suspects of a perfect GPA, president of a club, 
captain of a team, or first chair in the orchestra, but in the end, 
each is simply a tool with which to measure outperforming 
one’s peers. 
As one might imagine, family relationships based on the 
expectation of a child excelling above and beyond his or her 
peers, even if unspoken, easily become conditional. Dere-
siewicz writes that what is “expected by many parents in 
affluent communities is not a personal best but the absolute 
best,” so even if all little Johnny can manage in his 10th grade 
English class is a B+, that will not cut it at home.6 Ultimately, 
the “production of measurable virtue in children” is the goal 
towards which Mom and Dad direct life. As Deresiewicz aptly 
notes, though, measureable here means “capable of showing up 
on a college application.”7 Spending time “hanging out” or 
hiking local trails on the weekend are not items that frequent 
most resumes; learning a second language or tutoring under-
resourced kids are. 
3 Deresiewicz, Excellent Sheep, 41.
4 Ibid., 46.
5 Ibid., 4.
6 Ibid., 45.
7 Ibid., 50. 
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Given the enormous expectations faced by students to be 
the very best, it is no wonder that their identities are found in 
“measurable” achievement. However, such identity is not only 
given to Deresiewicz’s sheep. They also consume, perpetuate, 
and preach it. The currency of this identity is Ivy League 
acceptances, perfect SAT scores, and Instagram photos from 
exotic trips. These are the symbols of status and accomplish-
ment one can quietly slip into conversation with just enough of 
an “aw, shucks” attitude to draw the verbal affirmation of one’s 
peers while, one hopes, also making them jealous. 
A deep, addictive satisfaction comes from such recogni-
tion. If one possesses enough of this currency, one becomes 
entitled to his or her peers’ praise. And these excellent sheep 
will do just about anything to strike it rich—or avoid coming up 
empty. The purpose of life “becomes the accumulation of gold 
stars,” and what constitutes a valid life becomes “affluence, 
credentials, and prestige” rather than pursuing one’s passions.8
Professions that do not ultimately land six-figure salaries and 
luxurious homes are not worth our time. Credentials that are not 
instantaneously recognizable are without value. The pursuit of 
meaning beyond a strong resume is nonsensical. Deresiewicz 
imagines those deep-seated concerns with failure in the form of 
a series of potent questions:
How can I become a teacher, or a minister, or a carpen-
ter? Wouldn’t that be a waste of my fancy education? 
What would my parents think? What would my friends 
think? How would I face my classmates at our twentieth 
reunion, when they’re all rich doctors or important peo-
ple in New York? And the question that exists behind 
them all: isn’t it beneath me?9
These questions strike at the heart of the matter: everyone 
is afraid of failing in front of parents and peers, showing any 
sign of weakness, or having to show up at the reunion as a 
8 Ibid., 20.
9 Ibid., 25.
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non-profit worker because neither McKinsey nor Bain nor 
Goldman ever came calling. As a result, one must be able to do 
everything and do everything well. The cost of falling short in 
this respect becomes “not merely practical, but existential.”10
To not ultimately land at an Ivy League or one of its neighbors 
on the way to a successful career in finance, consulting, law, or 
medicine is the same as being worthless. And so we develop all 
the necessary abilities for this kind of life—not how to think 
but rather those “analytical and rhetorical skills that are
necessary for success in business and the professions.”11
Ross Douthat memorably relates from his four years at 
Harvard how he was taught to get away with doing as little as 
possible. For him it was hard work to “get into Harvard,” to 
compete for “offices and honors with thousands of brilliant and 
driven young people,” and to fight for “law school slots and I-
banking jobs as college wound to a close.”12 The academics, 
though, were not hard work. They were “the easy part.”13 As a 
result, it was a rare sheep indeed that invested more time in true 
learning than in making connections or crafting the perfect 
resume. Deresiewicz is no kinder, suggesting that what “Ivy 
League-caliber schools like Yale or Columbia teach their 
students is how to pretend, and how to do it well.”14 Ultimately, 
we build an identity around accomplishments that can pad a 
resume, and we hope those resumes are strong enough to shore 
up our self-esteem in the event of a calamitous development 
such as criticism or failure. 
Interestingly, the question why? is rarely asked—why it 
matters so much that our SAT scores clear 1500 instead of 
1400, why our BA must come from Princeton instead of 
Rutgers, or why our first job has to be with J.P Morgan instead 
10 Ibid., 22.
11 Ibid., 63.
12 Ross Douthat, Privilege: Harvard the Education of the Rul-
ing Class (New York: Hyperion, 2005), 140.
13 Ibid., 140. 
14 Deresiewicz, Excellent Sheep, 104.
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of a non-profit. Dwight Macdonald once remarked upon the 
great curiosity that “we think it odd that a man should devote 
his life to writing poems . . . but natural that he should devote it 
to inducing children to breakfast on Crunchies instead of 
Krispies.”15 There is a depressing humor in Macdonald’s
observation, for who on the path to hard-earned success would 
not recognize a well-paid marketing position with Kellogg as a 
post more enviable than that of a high school English teacher? 
Furthermore, there is a premise underlying this notion of 
success that is similarly left in the shadows: that “what makes 
for a happy life and a good society [is] simply self-evident, . . . 
as if in either case the exclusive answer [is] more money.”16 It 
is a premise, though, that is accepted by a majority of students. 
In 1971, only 37% of incoming college freshmen said it was 
essential or very important to be “very well-off financially”
compared to 73% who said it was similarly important to 
“develop a meaningful philosophy of life.”17 In 2011, “the 
numbers were almost reversed,” with 80% believing that being 
very well off is essential versus only 47% emphasizing the 
importance of developing a meaningful philosophy of life.18
However, even those who achieve their goal of success, as 
has already been noted, do not do so without cost. In fact, there 
is a great deal of research and anecdotal evidence pointing to a 
deep-seated unhappiness within the hearts and minds of the 
high achievers among us. Deresiewicz writes that preteens and 
teens from affluent and well-educated families experience 
“among the highest rates of depression, substance abuse, 
anxiety disorders, somatic complaints, and unhappiness of any 
group of children” in the United States, with “as many as 22 
percent of adolescent girls from financially comfortable 
families” suffering from clinical depression.19
15 Ibid., 96.
16 Ibid., 77.
17 Ibid., 79.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 46.
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The disastrous effects of the pressure placed on teens in 
upper-middle class homes is heartbreakingly documented by 
Madeline Levine in her New York Times Bestseller, The Price 
of Privilege. Her stories are similar and numerous, covering a 
host of problems from drug abuse to binge drinking to anxiety 
and depression to anorexia. Levine writes that “as many as 30 
to 40 percent of twelve- to eighteen-year olds from affluent 
homes are experiencing troubling psychological symptoms,”
which do nothing to lower the frequency of harmful behaviors 
and the intensity of the pressure to succeed that is felt.20 The 
backdrop to each of her stories of young men and women 
abusing drugs and alcohol, cutting, contemplating suicide, and 
reporting remarkable unhappiness is almost universally a 
combination of a crushing pressure to succeed, a crippling fear 
of failure, and a misguided belief that pressing on might 
somehow lead to happiness. These are the stories of excellent 
sheep, and they are a wakeup call to those of us who either 
tacitly or expressly endorse an environment of high-pressure 
perfectionism. 
When coupled with a deep unhappiness, this constant pur-
suit of “success” is exhausting. And yet, we continue to trap 
ourselves in this vicious cycle. The pursuit of status, success, 
and high achievement at the cost of sleep, relationships, true 
learning, and even happiness becomes a race with no finish 
line. So why do we keep running? Simply stated, we are slaves 
to the opinions of others. Students are “trained to depend” upon
the “drug of praise.”21 We become presidents of clubs, captains 
of teams, and students with perfect GPAs and SAT scores not 
because we genuinely enjoy them but because those are the 
things that ensure we will receive the most praise. These 
symbols of achievement “signify not just your fate, but your 
20 Madeline Levine, The Price of Privilege: How Parental 
Pressure and Material Advantage Are Creating a Generation of 
Disconnected and Unhappy Kids (New York: Harper, 2006), 19.
21 Deresiewicz, Excellent Sheep, 51.
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identity; not just your identity, but your value. They are who 
you are, and what you’re worth.”22
Self-worth becomes comparative in nature. If we don’t 
score as well as other students on standardized tests, attend the 
same elite schools as our peers, or land the same prestigious 
jobs after graduation, we must suffer the low opinion of our 
parents, our friends, and our professors—an unacceptable 
prospect. The problem with self-worth based on a relative 
sentiment like opinion is that it engenders a severe internal 
uncertainty and instability. Under such circumstances, there can 
be little confidence of place or of one’s own value as an 
individual. In turn, such uncertainty demands the herculean 
efforts exhibited by those excellent sheep climbing ever higher 
on the ladder of success. 
Unfortunately for those sheep, though, there is no rooftop 
to reach, so the climbing never ends. When chasing after status 
and the high regard of others, one finds very quickly that 
“status doesn’t get you much except the knowledge that you 
have it.” Given its endless nature, this pursuit “doesn’t just not 
make you happy: it makes you actively unhappy” precisely 
because it is “comparative, and competitive, by its very nature.”
Deresiewicz shares the sorry experience of those students who 
get to places like Yale thinking they’ve arrived, “only to 
discover that there are still other places to arrive at” and that 
there always will be. Clearly, contentment and the pursuit of 
status do not mix.23
It should come as no surprise that a life spent running a 
race that has no finish line would be both exhausting and 
deeply unsatisfying, yet it would appear that many of us remain 
committed to the enterprise of chasing down success. This 
commitment is inextricably linked to a conception of self-love 
that is comparative. Our worth is bolstered when we compare 
ourselves to others and find that we are achieving just as much 
as or more than our peers, that we have at least the same or, 
22 Ibid., 16.
23 Ibid., 113.
Furman Humanities Review
102
better yet, higher GPAs than our fellow students, or that we got 
the internship commensurate to our elite education. 
This is a picture that many of us might recognize within 
ourselves. It is this kind of self love—a relative, comparative, 
and dangerous sentiment—that deserves further exploration, for 
to comprehend our unwavering commitments to success and 
status first requires an understanding of our own yardstick of 
self-worth. The comparative nature of our self-love is not 
unique to 21st-century high-achievers; it has long been the 
companion of humankind. Because this is the case, wisdom 
would demand that we examine what those who came before us 
have thought and written about our tendency to compare. 
When one explores the works of the world’s great thinkers, 
it does not take long to realize that many have identified and 
analyzed this very issue. Of all those who have written about it, 
though, there is one that stands out. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an 
18th-century political philosopher, presents an articulation and 
analysis of amour-propre, or vanity—our tendency to value 
ourselves based on how we compare to those around us—that is 
unrivaled in its clarity, frankness, and forcefulness of argument. 
To read Rousseau is to view the human soul with an X-ray. 
He exposes, as only he can, the many masks of benevolence, 
humility, and selflessness we wear to cover the ambition, ill 
will towards others, and selfishness we harbor. However, what 
makes Rousseau’s analysis of the problem of comparative self-
love the best of its kind (and so helpful for our excellent sheep) 
is that he traces its development from cradle to full-fledged 
adulthood. According to Rousseau, we are not born as hateful, 
vain, or callous individuals but rather as people who learn to be 
just so. To more fully understand the quandary of Dere-
siewicz’s excellent sheep, joining Rousseau at man’s beginning 
is a helpful place to start, before tracing the progression to the 
final product—namely, an individual who bases his or her value 
on the opinions and judgments of others. 
For Rousseau, natural man begins as a blank slate, re-
moved from any and all “artificial faculties he could only have 
acquired by prolonged progress,” such as language, tools, 
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buildings, or farming.24 In this state, Rousseau finds a man 
“sating his hunger beneath an oak, slaking his thirst at the first 
stream, finding his bed at the foot of the same tree that supplied 
his meal, and with that his needs are satisfied.”25 This is a 
person in simplest form, needing nothing more than food, 
water, and shelter. When deprived of every sort of enlighten-
ment, the only goods known to natural man are “food, a female, 
and rest,” and natural man does not even possess the 
“knowledge of death and its terrors.”26 In fact, so blind is 
natural man to anything past the present that “his projects, as 
limited as his views, hardly extend to the close of day.”27
Part of the utter simplicity of natural man is tied to a desire 
for self-preservation. Rousseau writes that man’s “first care”
was “that for his preservation,” a driving force that leads a 
person to seek only the most basic needs.28 This kind of desire 
is described by Rousseau as “self-love—a primitive, innate 
passion, which is anterior to every other.”29 It is not hateful or 
desiring of the approval of others. To Rousseau, “self-love, 
which regards only ourselves, is contented when our true needs 
are satisfied.”30
However, the trouble begins when we leave a solitary life 
and interact with other human beings. By virtue of seeing 
another person, one observes the differences that exist between 
one’s self and the other. In fact, Rousseau argues that the very 
act of thinking—something unique to the human race—requires 
24 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin and Foun-
dations of Inequality Among Men or Second Discourse,” in 
Rousseau: The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. 
Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 134.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 142.
27 Ibid., 143.
28 Ibid., 161.
29 Ibid., 213.
30 Ibid.
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that we make distinctions and identify what makes each object 
and person unique. For instance, Rousseau challenges his 
reader to try and outline the image of a tree without specifics 
but goes on to argue that such a task is impossible. He writes 
that “in spite of yourself, [the tree] will have to be seen as small 
or large, bare or leafy, light or dark . . . you cannot help making 
its lines perceptible or its surface colored.”31 It is impossible to 
see things generally—we view the world in specifics. Ultimate-
ly, thinking amounts to distinguishing between various objects 
and ideas, so when one person comes in contact with another, 
specific comparison is inevitable.
As Rousseau states, “The first glance [man] casts on his 
fellows leads him to compare himself with them.”32 Even if no 
malevolence is intended, we gauge who is taller, who is faster, 
or who is stronger. Rousseau notes that “the relations which we 
express by the words great, small, strong, weak, fast, slow, 
fearful, bold, and other such ideas, compared as need required 
and almost without thinking about it, finally produced in him 
some sort of reflection, or rather a mechanical prudence that 
suggested to him the precautions most necessary for his 
safety.”33
It is not long, though, before elementary comparisons de-
velop into a habit of comparing more than height, speed, or 
strength. Rousseau notes that while man was “scarcely able to 
discriminate ranks, . . . he was from afar preparing to claim first 
rank as an individual.”34 From this first point of comparison, 
the long fall from innocence begins. Rousseau’s description is 
worth quoting at length:
Everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish to 
be looked at himself, and public esteem acquired a price. 
The one who sang or danced best; the handsomest, the 
31 Ibid., 148.
32 Ibid., 235.
33 Ibid., 162.
34 Ibid.
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strongest, the most skillful, or the most eloquent came to 
be the most highly regarded, and this was the first step 
at once toward inequality and vice: from these first pref-
erences arose vanity and contempt on the one hand, 
shame and envy on the other; and the fermentation 
caused by these new leavens eventually produced com-
pounds fatal to happiness and innocence.35
Thus is born amour-propre, or vanity. It is “a relative sen-
timent, factitious, and born in society, which inclines every 
individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone 
else.”36 Not only that, it also “demands others to prefer us to 
themselves, which is impossible.”37 For Rousseau, it is inescap-
able. It is not just that we became vain and envious, though. 
Amour-propre, a sentiment of vanity and comparison, has a 
distinct character, one of “consuming ambition” that “instills in 
all men a black inclination to harm one another, a secret 
jealousy that is all the more dangerous as it often assumes the 
mask of benevolence in order to strike its blow in greater 
safety.”38
Rousseau’s analysis clearly identifies what the mental pro-
cesses behind amour-propre actually are. After all, how often 
do we wear masks of benevolence in order to ensure that we are 
ultimately viewed as better than our peers? How often do we 
feign humility or generosity or kindness simply for the sake of 
being thought of as humble, generous, or kind?  How many 
times have we cared far more about how others viewed us than 
about the morality or character of our actions? Not as immedi-
ately clear, though, are the consequences of this kind of self-
love, and this is where Rousseau’s articulation of the deepest 
impact of amour-propre is so compelling. 
35 Ibid., 166.
36 Ibid., 218.
37 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, trans. Alan 
Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 214.
38 Rousseau, “Second Discourse,” 171.
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The nature of amour-propre is such that it takes an indi-
vidual content with a simple life and teaches him or her to 
depend upon the opinion of others for value and meaning. The 
effect is one of deep unhappiness because a self-love based 
upon comparisons made with others is never assured of stability 
or fulfillment. In other words, we can always find something 
with which to compare ourselves and in which to find ourselves 
lacking. 
Rousseau relates the story of a young man, who, seeing 
another young man “better dressed than himself,” secretly 
complains “about his parents’ avarice.”39 However, if this same 
young man finds himself “more adorned than another,” he is 
“pained to see this other outshine him by birth or wit, and to see 
all his gilding humiliated in the presence of a simple cloth 
suit.”40 If nothing else, Rousseau teaches us that there are 
innumerable ways to find one’s self inferior to others and that 
this leads to a profound unhappiness. Much like the young 
people Deresiewicz and Levine describe as suffering from 
tremendous pressure to succeed (and the resulting assortment of 
consequences), Rousseau’s young man is an example of the 
deep insecurity and unhappiness resulting from dependence on 
a feeling of relative success among one’s peers.  
Of course, there is an assumption necessarily made preced-
ing an individual’s dependence on his or her standing in the 
eyes of others, which is that status, praise, and money are 
actually valuable in and of themselves. Rousseau writes that “in 
order to see the purpose of so many cares . . . power and 
reputation would have to have some sort of meaning in [a 
man’s] mind.” There is a critical lesson learned, namely that 
“there is a sort of men who count how they are looked upon by 
the rest of the universe for something, who can be happy and 
satisfied with themselves on the testimony of others rather than 
on their own.”41
39 Rousseau, Emile, 228.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 187.
Nathan Thompson
107
There is much of ourselves to be recognized in these 18th-
century writings—a frantic habit of comparison, of looking in 
the mirror to ensure everything appears just right, of assigning 
great weight to unquantifiable concepts of status or reputa-
tion—and Rousseau forcefully accounts for how we arrive at 
such a position. From that first glance at another human being 
right up to the birth of that dark inclination to see harm done to 
those around us, the path is well worn. But if in fact the 
tendency to compare to others to the point of exhaustion and 
unhappiness is not just a tendency but also an intractable 
plague, is there anything to be done? 
Reading Rousseau’s assessment of our character is both a 
powerful and—if one takes his claims about human nature 
seriously—disconcerting experience.  His analysis unceremoni-
ously strips away our masks of benevolence and sincerity, 
revealing the jealousy, unsympathizing ambition, and paralyz-
ing fear that we seek to hide. But does it do us any good only to 
know that day in and day out, we ask others to value us above 
themselves? That the recognition and status we inevitably 
pursue only makes us vain and insecure people? That the 
moment we meet others, we begin making comparisons that can 
only end in enmity? While recognizing a problem can be a 
helpful step, to end on such a note given the reality of amour-
propre does little to address Rousseau’s predicament or offer 
solace to Deresiewicz’s sheep. Thus, an exploration of 
Rousseau’s conception of a life without amour-propre—a life 
of true happiness—becomes necessary.
Rousseau claims that “it is a hundred times easier to be 
happy than to appear to be happy,” and this serves as an 
outstanding introduction to his notion of happiness.42 This 
thought demands that we ask ourselves a question, and it is one 
that Deresiewicz is quick to point out that many high achieving 
college students either do not know or are too afraid to ask. 
This question, surprising as it may be, is not “what will make 
me the most successful in life?” or “what will earn me the most 
42 Ibid., 354.
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money in life?” Instead the question is “what makes me 
happy?” As much of a cliché as it is, this remains an important 
question for a society that so readily surrenders its happiness 
and self-worth to the opinions of other people. Rousseau’s 
insight calls for reflection on what we are doing to appear 
happy to others and what we might change so that we are 
actually happy. 
Rousseau’s answer to this question, perhaps not surprising-
ly, has little to do with obtaining an Ivy League degree, 
working for a prestigious consulting firm, or owning a nice 
house. In fact, it begins with simplicity, a virtue with which 
many at the top of the food chain may be unfamiliar. This 
becomes clear in a number of his writings, particularly his 
“Second Discourse,” “Book IV” of Emile, and his Reveries of 
the Solitary Walker. Rousseau describes the experience of a 
wealthy man who owns a palace but finds no use for all the 
rooms because he cannot occupy each one. In the end, it 
becomes a gilded cage, promising luxury but delivering an 
experience of imprisonment.43 The great flaw of amour-
propre’s relative nature is that it spurs the accumulation of 
excess (money, clothes, land, titles, reputation), which only 
gives people more and more ways to compare what they do or 
do not possess. As Rousseau writes, “Sociable man, always 
outside himself, is capable of living only in the opinion of 
others and, so to speak, derives the sentiment of his own 
existence solely from their judgment.”44 To Rousseau, the first 
and proper response to the comparative tendencies of amour-
propre is to make an effort to return to simplicity. 
An example of what this kind of simplicity looks like for 
Rousseau is captured in his Fifth Walk of the Solitary Walker, 
during which he describes his days spent on a nearly deserted 
island in the middle of a Swiss lake. This sort of abandonment 
of society may strike the modern observer as decidedly odd. 
After all, Rousseau does not have an iPhone or laptop on his 
43 Ibid., 347.
44 Rousseau, “Second Discourse,” 187.
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person, so there will be no way to share with others what he 
sees; he has only his memory to capture everything around him. 
The scene before Rousseau is one where “there is more natural 
greenery, more meadows, grove-shaded retreats, more frequent 
contrasts, and more variety in the terrain” than on the main-
land.45 Life on the island forbids “any kind of communication 
with the mainland so that being unaware of all that went on in 
the world I might forget its existence and that it might also 
forget mine.”46 On Rousseau’s island, no filtered (or #nofilter) 
Instagram posts reach the rest of society. No Facebook statuses 
describing the “incredible” or “awesome” or “breathtaking”
sights of this island reach the newsfeeds of others, and none of 
their communications reach Rousseau. Pleasure is taken from 
nothing other than a short walk. Hours are spent observing the 
beauty of a single flower. Reward is drawn from an afternoon 
paddling around the lake. 
Another aspect of this simplicity is its decided lack of ori-
entation towards a set of tasks or goals. Rousseau’s days are 
spent “without having any well-determined or constant object,”
a concept that also might fail to compute for a 21st-century 
achiever.47 Somehow, though, this kind of simplicity is what 
brings Rousseau the most happiness, and he calls these aimless 
days “a hundred times preferable to the sweetest things I had 
found in what are called the pleasures of life.”48
Simplicity is only the beginning of happiness for        
Rousseau, though, because the value of a simple life rests on 
the bedrock of a more important idea, that true contentment is 
found in the sentiment of one’s existence—that the fact of 
being alive is enough for one to always be satisfied with life. 
One may argue that it is impossible to live a contented and 
45 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Reveries of the Solitary Walker,
in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, ed. Christopher Kelly 
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000), 41.
46 Ibid., 42.
47 Ibid., 44.
48 Ibid.
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fulfilled life by merely appreciating one’s existence, but 
Rousseau makes a compelling case that demands a serious
response. 
In his Reveries of the Solitary Walker, Rousseau describes 
the experience of awakening to how unnecessarily he was 
weighed down by the opinions of others. He first believed 
others viewed him as “the horror of the human race,” observing 
that “the only greeting passersby would give [him] would be to 
spit” on him.49 This caused great agitation, indignation, and a 
tendency to struggle “without cleverness, without craft . . . 
without prudence.”50 However, after realizing that such inner-
conflict only ever resulted in an endless struggle over what 
cannot be controlled (the opinions of others), he took the only 
remaining course, namely “submitting to [his] fate without 
railing against necessity any longer.”51 Rousseau recognized 
how much stock he set by the expectations and opinions of 
others and, understanding he could not control either one, 
finally decided to refrain from assigning them value. No longer 
chained to what others think or say about him, Rousseau is able 
to find ultimate meaning and value in his own life. 
For Rousseau, the sentiment of existence possesses beauty 
and mystery. In his Fifth Walk, he says it is a sentiment 
“stripped of any other emotion, is in itself a precious sentiment 
of contentment and of peace which alone would suffice to make 
this existence dear and sweet to anyone able to spurn all the 
sensual and earthly impressions which incessantly come to 
distract us from it and to trouble its sweetness here-below.”52
The appeal of the argument for a happiness not derived from 
earthly pleasures and the comparisons it leads us to make is that 
it is dependent on no person other than one’s self. It is not by 
God’s help that we become truly content. It is not by the help of 
our neighbor. Rather, we become “like God,” Rousseau claims, 
49 Ibid., 4.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 46.
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when we are content in our own environment and with our own 
existence; by remaining in this state, “we are sufficient unto 
ourselves.”53
One can contest Rousseau’s claim of the ultimate source of 
this contentment, but his articulation of the truest expression of 
happiness is compelling for two reasons. First, it speaks to a 
longing for freedom from the social upkeep to which many feel 
chained, and second, there is a profound appeal found in a life 
committed to simplicity. In the end, Rousseau’s solution for a 
vain and comparing people is to attack the problem of amour-
propre at its source: the more simply we live, the fewer points 
of reference we have with which to compare. Stated most 
succinctly, Rousseau’s conception of happiness is a simple life 
drawn from the deeper well of our own self-sufficiency and 
contentment with existence. 
One may observe that no excellent sheep is an island, but 
even still, a serious reading of Rousseau’s assessment of 
amour-propre and his solution to the problem demands sober 
reflection on our habit of comparison to others and what might 
be done about it. To Rousseau, amour-propre is deeply 
entrenched. Worse still for us, we are unable to retreat from 
society in quite the same way Rousseau does in his Reveries.
Nevertheless, we can still ask the questions of ourselves that his 
analysis raises—what do we do because we enjoy the praise it 
earns us? What do we do for fear of not measuring up if we do 
not? What do we refuse to do for fear of failure? How often do 
we find ourselves quite literally looking at another person and 
considering the ways in which we think he or she is better or 
worse than us? 
These are questions that, if asked seriously, should illumi-
nate the places where we are most enslaved to the opinions of 
others; as such, asking these questions can be a risk, for to 
examine the parts of ourselves that are dependent on others is to 
acknowledge vulnerabilities we may wish to remain unexposed. 
Despite this risk, though, a willingness to search for substantive 
53 Ibid.
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answers to the questions of why we burn the midnight oil, join 
ten clubs, and cast every part of life in terms of success or 
failure is, in my estimation, the first step towards freedom from 
the opinion of others.
Deresiewicz and Rousseau both articulate the pervasive 
problem of a life spent worrying about what others think of 
you. For them, such a life is an exercise in exhaustion and 
unhappiness. It is a treadmill of accomplishments, empty 
accolades, stress, and, most importantly, constant comparison, 
and it leaves those stuck running on it with no purpose other 
than to keep from falling off. Rousseau offers a solution to this 
problem, and it is one of radical contentment with the simple 
fact of one’s own existence. One may find such an existence to 
be deeply unsatisfying or impractical. However, by proposing 
such a remedy, Rousseau moves the conversation forward, and 
in doing so, he raises the question that any excellent sheep 
should be keen to address: if a life spent on the treadmill of 
success leads to unhappiness, how do we step off?
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